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Economic Problems of Ireland in Europe
Martin Feldstein*
Abstract: This paper uses the recent controversy between the European Union
and the Irish Republic to discuss the more general relationship between the
European Union, the EMU and the member countries. Despite outstanding
economic growth and budget surpluses, heland has been criticised by the
European Commission because it has reduced taxes in the context of a relatively
high rate of inflation. The first part of the paper considers the ways in which the
EMU is likely to affect inflation and cyclical unemployment in the member
countries over the longer term. The second part deals more specifically with the
current Irish situation and the reasons for an EU reprimand of a very small
country. That part suggests that an alternative standard, based on the principle of
"do no harm," would have lead to a different outcome. Finally, the paper
describes a policy of creating investment-based personal retirement accounts that
would allow Ireland to share its future budget surpluses with taxpayers in a way
that does not contribute to inflationaW pressures.
1. Introduction
Economic conditions in h’eland have improved dramatically in recent
years. When I first visited Ireland in the 1960s, Dublin was a veW
depressed city. The economic statistics and the facts about emigration
from Ireland confirmed these casual impressions. Now all that has
changed. The Dublin of today is an attractive, exciting, and clearly
affluent ciW. Emigration has been replaced by net immigration. And the
economic statistics confima rapidly rising incomes and falling
unemployment. By these measures, Ireland is now the star performer in
Europe. That performance has also benefited the Irish budget situation,
producing substantial budget surpluses and falling national debt.
* Martin Feldstein is the George F. Baker Professor of Economics at Harvard University and
President of the National Bureau of Economic Research. This paper is based on the Geary
Lecture presented at The Economic and Social Research Institute in Dublin, Ireland on
March 5, 2001. I am grateful to nay colleague Professor John McHale l:or discussions about
the current Irish economic situation.
This outstanding perfom~ance reflects a number of things. As a public
¯ finance specialist I give a great deal of weight to the tax policies that
encouraged both domestic economic activities and the inflow of foreign
direct investment. Ireland pursued good policies and they have paid off in
excellent economic performance.
Unfortunately, the strong growth that has produced tight labour
markets in Ireland and high demand for real estate has led to
unacceptably high inflation. And because of the single currency in the
Economic and MonetaW Union, there can be no offsetting movements of
interest rates br the exchange rate to dampen that rise. The rising level of
prices is a potentially serious problem for Ireland because it threatens the
international competitiveness on which Ireland’s exports - and to some
extent its ability to attract direct foreign investment - depend.
The European Commission and the Council of Ministers have recently
criticised Ireland’s current budget as too expansionaW for an economy
with Ireland’s high rate of inflation because some of the projected surplus
will be used to lower taxes and to invest in improving the nation’s
infrastructure. I think this criticism is misplaced. I think it is also indicative
of a more general type of problem within the European Union that will
become more common in the future.
Moreover, the criticism directed at the current expansionary budget is
probably based on something very different. Ireland’s ability to attract
foreign investment reflects in substantial part the low level of corporate
tax on foreign fire, s. For many years, Ireland taxed foreign corporate
profits at a rate of only 10 per cent while domestic Irish companies paid a
tax of 30 per cent. Firms in most other European countries also paid
corporate tax rates of 30 per cent or more. This strong incentive for firms
to locate in h’eland was resented by the rest of Europe. Ireland was
declared to be pursuing an illegal policy in giving a differentially low rate
of tax to foreign firms. But although others in Europe expected Ireland to
respond by raising the tax rate on foreign firms to the pre-existing rate on
Irish fim~s, the Irish government decided to cut the rate on domestic firms
to only 12.5 per cent and to levy that rate on foreign firms as well. The
enom~ous gap between the corporate tax rate elsewhere in Europe and
the 12.5 per cent in Ireland has been a continuous thorn in the side of
other European nations. Since tax rates are a matter of national
sovereignty tinder the Maastricht Treaty, there is no legal basis for
complaint. Many observers believe that the complaint against Ireland’s
current budget policy is an indirect way of expressing the distaste of
Ireland’s European partners for Ireland’s corporate tax policy.
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These developments and conditions provide the background for this
lecture. I begin by discussing my perspective on the economics and
politics of the European Economic and Monetary Union in general. I then
turn to the current situation of Ireland and its conflict with the European
Commission and the other members of the European Union. Finally, I will
offer a suggestion that would allow Ireland to share its future budget
surpluses with taxpayers in a way that does not contribute to inflationary
pressures.
2. The Economics and Politics of EMU~
I believe the EMU is economically unnecessary and is likely to be harmful
to economic performance in the long run. I believe that its motivation -
the reason that the EMU exists today - is political rather than economic.
And what worries me most is that the development that follows will be a
source of political conflict - within Europe and with the United States. I
now discuss each of these themes in order.
First, the monetary union and the single currency are not necessary for
the expansion of trade within Europe. The initial campaign for the EMU -
the Delors report entitled, "One Market, One Money," was based on a
false premise. Nothing in economic theory or experience implies that
countries must have a single currency for trade among them to flourish.
The lowering of trade barriers by the creation of a Single Market was
important for encouraging trade but the introduction of a single currency
was not. The US trade with Canada - our largest trading partner - does
not depend on a fixed exchange rate. The same is true of trade between
US and Japan - America’s second largest trading partner. Japan’s large
volume of exports has certainly not depended on a fixed exchange rate.
And the surge of US-Mexican trade after NAFTA - despite substantial
currency volatility in the dollar-peso exchange rate - shows that what
matters is trade barriers, tariffs, and quotas, rather than a single currency.
But the single currency is not just irrelevant. It is a potential source of
poor economic performance - of higher inflation and higher
unemployment - than would happen if each European country kept its
own currency. Moreover, the policy dynamics that accompany the EMU
’This section draws upon and extends several of my earlier articles, including: "The Case
Against the EMU," The Economist, June 13 (1992); "EMU and International Conflict," Foreign
Affairs (1997); "The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union:
Political Sources of an Economic LiabiliW," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Fall (1997), and
"The Euro Risk," Time, JanualT 25 (1999).
are likely to cause tax policy developments that are less favourable to
growth in the long run. Let me explain.
I will start with inflation. Although the inflation situation in Ireland is
improving, it remains a serious problem. If the Irish pound were a
floating currency, the increasing inflation would automatically cause the
rate of interest in Ireland to rise. That automatic process would restrain
demand and lower inflation. In addition, the central bank could reinforce
this process by more tightening that raises real interest rates further. A
countW with monetaW independence can control its inflation.
Now, because of the single currency, the interest rate in Ireland is set
in Frankfurt. In determining the Europe-wide interest rate, the European
Central Bank (ECB) looks at Eurozone conditions as a whole. The
situation in h’eland, which represents only 1 per cent of the GDP of
Europe - gets essentially no weight in the decisions of the ECB.
In short, the experience of Ireland is an example of how countries and
regions may experience unacceptably high inflation without any reaction
from ECB and of course without any spontaneous, automatic rise in the
country’s interest rate. h’eland’s current inflation problem is just the first
example of this general problem brought about by the EMU’s single
currency.
But the problem of inflation within Europe is more than just the
problem of differences in inflation rates in different individual countries. I
believe that over time the average rate of inflation in Europe as a whole
will be higher, possibly substantially higher, because of EMU than it
would be otherwise.
Why? There is now a consensus in Europe in favour of low inflation.
Low inflation was built into the convergence conditions for joining the
EMU. But even in the yeats before the Maastricht treaty, countries sought
to achieve Germany’s low inflation rate because a failure to do so would
entail the ignominy of a devaluation relative to the German mark.
The strong aversion to inflation in Germany itself- probably the
countW with the strongest anti-inflation public sentiment in the world -
provided a potential anchor for inflation in Europe as whole. As long as
the Bundesbank pursued a tough anti-inflation monetaW policy, Europe
in general would have a low inflation rate.
Now that has all changed. The Bundesbank no longer makes
monetaW policy for Germany. MonetaW policy is made by the European
Central Bank. There, all countries are technically equal. In making
monetaW policy, the rule is: one countW equals one vote. Now there is
suppot* for a low inflation policy. But how long will it last? If
unemployment starts rising throughout Europe because of inadequate
demand while inflation is rising, what would the multi-national board of
the ECB do? I suspect that 10 years from now - or perhaps sooner - the
ECB will be more tolerant of inflation that it is today. Although the
German voice at the ECB will be strong, it will be just one voice among
many. The result may be a return to the higher inflation rates that
characterised many of the European countries back in the 1970s and
1980s.
The independence of the ECB and its ability to make monetaw policy
decisions without political interference also remains to be tested. In
principle, the independence of the ECB is guaranteed by the Maastricht
Treaty. But the ECB members are politically appointed and may be
reluctant to act in ways that would displease their political appointers -
especially if they expect to return to their home countries and seek new
political appointments after their years at the ECB.
Moreover, there is continuing agitation - by the French in particular -
for the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) - to have a
more powerful role as a counterweight to the ECB. There are those who
argue that the independence of the ECB is too great and that its lack of
political accountability is unacceptable in a democracy. Although such
independence is well accepted in Germany, it is a much newer and
radical departure from the traditions of most other European, countries. A
period of economic downturn that pits the ECB against the political
leaders of Europe may bring about a fundamental change in its
independence.
All of this makes me worW that the low rate of inflation will not last.
The ECB means the end of German standard-setting and therefore
eliminates the basic source of price stability that provided an anchor for
all of Europe. The shift to a single monetary authority in which all
countries are equal is therefore likely to lead to a higher level of inflation
in the future.
3. Higher Cyclical Unemployment
The EMU arrangement is also likely to lead to a higher average level of
cyclical unemployment. The basic reason for this is the lack of flexibility
of individual country interest rates and exchange rates. To see why,
consider what would happen if Ireland experienced the opposite of its
current cyclical boom? If the Irish economy were to experience a
substantial economic recession, there would be no countervailing effect
fl’om Irish interest rates or fl’om the exchange rate to help the economy
recover. In contrast, if Ireland had a floating exchange rate, the level of
interest rates in Ireland would fall and the exchange rate would weaken.
This would be the natural and spontaneous response to a weaker
economy. The lower interest rate would stimulate interest sensitive
spending while the weaker exchange rate would stimulate net exports.
Both of these would contribute to a faster recovery. In addition, the Irish
central bank could act to depress interest rates further, with a likely
concurrent lowering of the exchange rate. With the EMU, none of this can
happen, the recovery would be slower and cyclical unemployment
higher. This situation is often summarised by saying that a one-size-fits-all
monetary policy is a serious problem. That is a correct conclusion. If the
future Irish cyclical downturn occurs at a time when the rest of Europe is
experiencing strong demand, the ECB would ignore the conditions in
Ireland and tighten monetary policy. The ECB is supposed to make
monetary policy on the basis of the economic conditions in the Eurozone
as a whole. Since Germany and France have half of the GDP of the
Eurozone, their conditions would be the focus of the ECB policy. The
ECB by its own rules would ignore an Irish recession just as it ignores
today’s Irish inflation.
But the problem is not just the inappropriateness of the one-size-fits-
all monetary policy. The single currency also precludes the natural
sponlaneous response of the interest rates and the exchange rate that
would occur even if the Irish Central Bank kept the money supply
constant. The lack of exchange rate flexibility means that the interest rate
mr, st be essentially the same in Dublin as it is in Paris or Rome. By
preventing any spontaneous response of interest rates or exchange rates,
the EMU system eliminates a major homeostatic feature of the economy
and will lead to higher average cyclical unemployment in the future.
What then could Ireland do to counter a future economic downturn?
The obvious answer is a fiscal expansion through tax cuts or higher
government spending. Unfortunately, that substitutes a blunt instrument
that is hard to change quickly for the more flexible instrument of
monetary policy. It also means that an expansion policy saddles the
economy with the permanent burden of a larger national debt. Moreover,
even if Ireland were willing to accept these disadvantages of using an
expansionary fiscal policy, it is not clear whether it would be allowed to
do so under the EMU’s Growth and Stability Pact that precludes large
budget deficits. How would the European Commission and the ECOFIN
respond if Ireland, starting with a cyclically enlarged budget deficit, then
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took steps to deliberately enlarge the deficit by cutting taxes and raising
government spending?
4. US Conditions and a Single Dollar Currency
My pessimism about the effects of a single currency on the long-run
average level of cyclical unemployment may seem strange coming from
an American. After all, the United States seems to do all right despite
having a single currency for an economy that is as large and diverse as
that of the Eurozone. Why does a one-size-fits-all monetaW policy work
better in the United States than I think it will for Europe? And why can
the United States have a low unemployment rate without internal regional
differences in interest rates and without separate currencies and exchange
rates for the different regions of the country?
The basic answer lies in three fundamental differences between the US
economy and the economies of Europe: flexible labour markets, internal
migration, and fiscal centralisation. Let me explain.
A rise in unemployment in a region of the United States - say the
Northeast or the Midwest - leads to lower wages in that region. These
shifts are large and rapid. Companies respond by raising employment and
shifting production to the regions With lower wage costs offsetting the
regional decline of demand. By contrast, wages in Europe are much less
responsive to cyclical conditions.
Internal migration within the United States is another important
response to regional shifts in demand. An increase in unemployment in
the Northeast or Midwest will cause a flow of workers to other parts of
the country with lower unemployment rates. A comparable flow of
people across national boundaries in Europe is unthinkable because of
differences in language. These linguistic barriers are reinforced by cultural
and institutional features that make mobility much less.
Finally, the United States has a centralised fiscal system in which most
taxes flow to Washington and most transfer payments come fi’om the
central government. That means an automatic fiscal stimulus to any region
in which demand declines. If GDP falls in my own state of Massachusetts,
the result is a smaller flow of tax dollars Dom Massachusetts residents to
Washington, DC and a larger flow of benefits from Washington, DC to
Massachusetts residents. Roughly speaking, each $100 decline in
Massachusetts’ GDP leads to a $40 net flow to Massachusetts - through
lower tax payments and higher transfer receipts.
These three natural forces - wage flexibility, internal migration, and
automatic fiscal transfers - strengthen the recoveries in individual regions
and make separate currencies unnecessary to dampen the Unemployment
response to regional shocks to demand.
5. Political Motivation for the EMU
I have been painting a rather bleak picture of the economic implications
of the EMU. Wily if this is true, did the leaders of Europe adopt a single
currency and why have 12 countries joined the EMU system?
The answer is politics. The motivation for the EMU is political not
economic. Although there are those who now deny it, the EMU is part of
a long-term strategy that goes back to Jean Monnet for the creation of the
United States of Effrope. The strategy ever since Monnet is to do so
through a series of incremental moves rather than in a single large jump.
Creation of a single currency is a major step irl that process. When
individuals hold Euros in their pockets instead of deutschmarks, francs, or
liras, they are bound to feel more like Europeans and less like Germans,
Frenchmen, or Italians. I know of no example today or in history of a
major country that does not have its own currency. The psycholog!cal
impact of the shift from national currencies to the single currency euro is
likely to be enormous. Moreover, the shift of monetary policy making
from national central banks to the ECB represents an enormous and very
visible shift of power from national capitals to Frankfurt and Brussels and
Strasbourg.
The programnae to evolve to a United States of Europe has multiple
motivations today. Not all of those who suppo~* EMU favour such a
political development. But it is nevertheless the driving force that has
brought Europe to this point in its evolution and that is likely to guide the
future economic policies and the future centralisation of power.
One of the primary initial motivations was to create a political union
that would avoid a repetition of the Franco-German wars that had done
so much harm three times in the century before the Treaty of Rome. This
is certainly a desirable goal - although I am not at all certain that forcing
Germany and France to abide by common political decisions is a good
way to avoid conflict. It could have just the opposite effect. Think, for
example, about the civil war in the United States in the 1860s that
resulted from the North’s desire to restrict slavery in the South. The
attempt of the Southern states to assert what they believed were their
rights under the US Constitution led to the invasion of the South by
Northern troops and a massive and destructive war. So the existence of a
single federal government and a written constitution is no guarantee of
peace.
In any case, the idea of war among the members of the EMU now
seems very remote. While Helmut Kohl would refer to this in defence of
the EMU, it always seemed to me to be redolent of an earlier age.
A more important reason - especially in the minds of French officials -
has been to establish a greater independent identity for Europe and to
counter the role of the United States in Europe. This was difficult to do as
long as the Soviet Union was a dominant threat and the cold war defined
international relations. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union there is
more scope for France to pursue this independent role for Europe. We
see it today in many forms: the formal creation of a European Security
and Defence Programme separate from NATO, the opposition of France
to US-UK policy on Iraq, the different attitude about genetically modified
food, etc.
But the political motivation for EMU was certainly not just about Euro-
American relations. For France, the pursuit of EMU and the strengthening
of the political union was also seen as a way for France to establish parity
with Germany. Before EMU, monetaW policy throughout Europe was
dominated by the Bundesbank. The Banque de France had no choice but
to mirror the interest rate changes in Germany. EMU and the ECB gives
France parity with Germany in the making of monetary policy. More
generally, after German reunification, it looked in France as if Germany
would be the ovelwhelming economic and political power in Europe.
Institutions like the ECB, the ECOFIN and the expanded role of the
Commission would (the French hoped) limit German power.
For Germany, the motivations are more complex and less clear.
Helmut Kohl emphasised a stronger Europe as a way of containing and
controlling German power. Others in Germany no doubt see a European
Federal State as a way for Germany - the countW with the greatest
population and largest economy, located in the geographic centre of the
expanded Europe - to be the dominant player on the continent.
These two views - the French desire to achieve parity in economic
policy and leadership in foreign policy, and the German desire to exert its
role as the leading countiT of Europe - are clearly not compatible and are
a potential source of future conflict between these two countries.
Outside France and Germany the reasons that drove countries to join
EMU are varied and complex. I believe the Italians were eager to join
because membership showed that Italy was able to stand alongside
France and Gerlnany as a major nation of Europe. Being left out - even
though Italy did not come close to meeting the Maastricht economic
criteria for admission - would have been a major blow to Italy’s national
prestige since it had been a founding member of the Treaty of Rome.
Spain was eager to join because membership was an important piece
of evidence that Spain had outgrown its days as an outcast under General
Franco. For many other countries, membership meant not being left
behind and having a seat at the table where pan-European decisions
would be taken.
To summarise what I have been saying, nay basic point is that EMU
will have serious long-run adverse effects on inflation and cyclical
tlnemployment in Europe. Its motivation has been political not economic.
Bad economic outcomes are a price that member countries have accepted
- knowingly or unknowingly - in order to achieve political ends. For
France and Germany these political goals are basically incompatible and a
source of future friction. For other countries, the shift of political and
economic decisions from the national capital to Frankfurt, Brussels and
Strasbourg will have adverse economic consequences and may create
serious frictions with its neighbours and with the United States.
6. The Commission, the ECOFIN and the Irish Budget
This brings me to the recent conflict between Ireland and the European
Commission and the ECOFIN. To an outside observer, it seems most
remarkable that official criticism should be directed at a country with the
best economic perfonnance - low inflation and low unemployment,
strong economic growth, large budget surpluses and low national debt.
Your sin - as you know - is having a low corporate tax rate and, more
recently, using some of the budget surpluses to cut taxes and invest in
infrastructure.
There is of course nothing about the Irish budget or other Irish
policies that conflicts with either the Maastricht Treaty or the subsequent
Growth and Stability Pact. Ireland does not have a budget deficit or a
high level of national debt.
What then do Irish policies violate? According io the Commission, they
violate the guidance the Commission provides to each country as part of
its annual recommendations for the broad guidelines on the economic
policies of the member states of the European Union - and not just of the
EMU. Those guidelines urged Ireland to use its budget surplus to reduce
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aggregate demands and therefore to lower inflation. In the eyes of the
Commission, Ireland did not do that and deserves to be chastised.
It is significant that this is the first such criticism (based on the annual
guidelines) of any country by the Commission and Council. Is Ireland’s
sin the most serious economic problem in Europe? Should others not be
criticised before Ireland for failure to adopt polices to lower
unemployment? Should others not be criticised first for failing to adopt
policies that lower budget deficits and debt levels that still exceed the
Maastricht standard? And should others not be criticised first for industrial
subsidies that distort trade? It is hard for me to imagine any legitimate
reason why Ireland was singled out for the distinct honour of being the
first to be reprimanded.
Just how inflationary is the Irish budget? The Irish government has
said that the tax cuts were given as part of a general deal with the trade
unions to accept wage restraint in return for lower taxes. I do not know
enough about wage setting in Ireland to know whether the net effect of
combining an expansionary tax policy and a suppression of wage
demands will mean higher or lower inflation. I wonder whether the EC or
the ECOFIN knows enough to answer that question?
Would it not be better to leave that decision to Ireland? Certainly
Ireland has much more to lose Dom a rise in Irish inflation than any other
European country. And the officials in Ireland understand the leverage on
wage setting that tax cuts may be able to achieve far better than the staff
of the Commission in Brussels.
7. The New Saving Scheme
A novel and I think very good feature of the current Irish budget is the
New Saving Scheme. As I understand it, individuals may save up to
IR£2,400 per year for the next five years and receive a 25 per cent
supplement to their new special account from the government. Thus an
individual who saves IR£2,400 would have a starting balance of IR£3,000.
Now just what is the effect of this form of tax cut on aggregate
demand? First, it is clear that the 25 per cent grant does not go directly
into consumption, although it may add indirectly to aggregate
consumption and demand. The impact on demand and inflation’ depends
on how households respond to this new saving incentive.
As with everything in economics, there are a variety of possible
responses. Some individuals may just transferto the new accounts some
of the saving they otherwise would do and receive the 25 per cent match
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as a windfall. For such individuals, the tax cut in this form will not add to
demand at all.
Some individuals may treat the 25 per cent supplement as a substitute
for their own saving and cut their own saving by an equal amount. For
such individuals, consumption would rise. "
But the most likely response to this strong saving incentive is to
induce individuals to save more. Someone who normally saves IR£1,000 a
year might respond to the new incentive by saving IR£1,500 a year. For
such an individual, total consumption fails by IR£500.
In short, if the saving incentive succeeds in raising saving, aggregate
consumption and demand will fall. This part of the overall tax and budget
package would therefore be contractionaW.
Since we do not know how large the response will be to this saving
incentive, it is impossible to know on balance how the overall tax cut
would affect demand and inflation. It is too bad that the EC does not
seem to have thought about this.
8. A Rule for All Countrfes
The more basic issue is the criterion by which the Commission can decide
to reprimand a country for its behaviour. A large budget deficit (or a large
rise in an existing budget deficit) is a reason that is specifically provided
for by the Growth and Stability Pact on the grounds that large deficits
increase the risk of default by a member government. It is not clear how
necessary such collective action is since the financial markets are very
sensitive to default risk and would impose a risk premium on countries
with large deficits. Nevertheless, it is something that the governments
agreed to in the Growth and Stability Pact.
But why should the potential for a reprimand extend to general fiscal
policy of a government with a budget surplus and low national debt? And
if the Commission extends itself to this, where will it stop?
Pedro Solbes, The EU Commissioner responsible for economics and
finance, answered this question in a recent letter to the Economist
newspaper (February 24, 2001). According to Commissioner Solbes, the
Econom.ist’s earlier criticism of the Commission for its censure of Ireland
"fails to take into account the fundamentals of the EMU model. The
notion of national but co-ordinated economic powers is not only
embedded in the Maastricht Treaty but is also necessary to ensure an
appropriate policy mix against a background of a single monetary policy.
The coherence, consistency and predictability of the euro-area’s economic
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policy management is important for the credibility of our currency over
the medium term. Big or small does not make any difference here."
It is hard for me to understand the logic of this statement or to see
any form of national economic policy that Brussels could not consider to
be subject to review by the Commission.
What does "national but co-ordinated economic policies" mean? Either
Ireland is free to set its tax rates ’- subject to the budget deficit rules to
which it agreed in the Growth and Stability Pact - or it is not. Could
Ireland have "co-ordinated" its budget policy in a way that allowed it to
do what it has chosen to do? If not, in what sense would this be a
national policy?
It is interesting also that Mr. Solbes did not refer to "budget policies"
but wrote instead of "economic policies." Does that mean that every kind
of economic policy must be "co-ordinated" through Brussels in order to
be consistent with a single monetary policy? Did Ireland understand that,
in agreeing to a single currency, it would have to make its future
economic policies subservient to that end and to the judgment of
Brussels?
Mr. Solbes and the Commission base their reprimand on the principle
that "big or small does not make any difference" when it comes to "the
importance of the coherence, consistency and predictability of the euro-
area economic policy .... for the credibility of our currency over the
medium term". But how can the increase in demand in Ireland with just
about 1 per cent of the GDP of the Eurozone as a whole - have any
effect on the euro? Clearly it cannot.
If there is a justification for the Commission’s expression of concern
about Ireland’s policy it must be the idea that any policy of the
Commission and of the Community must be a general rule that can be
applied to all countries, small as well as big. But how should that general
rule be stated? There is no reason to make the general policy one that
precludes a domestic policy in one country if that policy does no harm in
the other countries.
9. Do No Harm
A sensible rule that could be applied to all countries might therefore be
something like this: the fiscal policy of each member country should do
no direct harm to other countries or to the community as a whole. That
"do no harm" standard could be applied equally to all countries - to a
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relatively, small country like Ireland as well as to larger countries like
Germany and Italy.
As a practical matter, of course, the "do no harm standard" would
have some mininmm threshold. This standard would mean that a very
small excess stimulus in a large country like Germany or Italy that is
experiencing rising inflation might not be a cause for comment while a
very large excess stimulus in a small country like Ireland under similar
conditions could be a cause for comment. The test in each case would
be: does this action do more than the threshold amount of direct harm to
other countries? On that basis, I find it hard to believe that the size and
structure of the current Irish budget are an appropriate reason for a
Commission reprimand.
10. Personal Retirement Accounts to Share Budget Surpluses
with the Taxpayers of Ireland
There is hov4ever a policy that I think Ireland nlight consider as a method
of sharing its current and future budget surpluses with the taxpayers of
Ireland in a way that does not contribute to inflationary pressures.
I visited Dublin last in September 1999, and met at that time with
Governor O’Connell at the Central Bank. We spoke about the then
current situation in Ireland and his concern about the high and rising rate
of inflation. He described the expected budget surpluses and the general
expectation that it would be used to reduce taxes as part of an overall
agreement with the trade unions.
My immediate reaction was to suggest an alternative to a tax cut that
would take the form of government, deposits in personal saving accounts
to start an investment-based social security pension programme. Now I
will confess that I’m generally very much in favour of such investment-
based social security pension accounts for all countries, regardless of their
current budget situation or macroeconomic condition. I favour such
universal investment-based individual accounts as a supplement to the
traditional pay-as-you-go pension systems that exist in the United States
and in most other OECD countries. I believe that such a mixed system,
with a significant investment-based component, is the best way to deal
with the problem of an ageing population that affects all countries around
the world. I will say more about the appeal of such accounts in general
but let me first say why they may be particularly appropriate for Ireland at
the present time, as a modification or in addition to the new National
Pension Reserve Fund.
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Government contributions to individual Personal Retirement Accounts
made in proportion to wages would, in a sense, be equivalent to an
across-the-board proportional wage increase. A fiat rate contribution to
each account would be equivalent to an equal pay increase for each
individual. Each individual would see his or her personal wealth rise by
that amount. And yet the extra compensation would not be directly
available to spend but would be added to national saving in much the
same way as it would if the government simply used the funds to buy
back national debt or to contribute to the National Pension Reserve Fund.
Of course, some individuals might respond to the extra funds in their
accounts by decreasing other savings. But the overall effect of the
deposits to Personal Retirement Accounts would undoubtedly be a
substantial increase in saving rather than in consumption.
The idea of using government deposits to personal retirement
accounts as part of a plan to reduce wage increases is one that I
borrowed from the Australians. Back in the 1980s, Australia faced
substantial pressure for wage increases. The government at that time was
a Labour government with strong ties to the Australian trade unions. It
negotiated an agreement in which the unions would forgo wage increases
if the employers would make contributions to a system of personal
retirement accounts. Although the employer contributions added to the
cost of employment, the personal retirement account deposits did not add
to consumption spending in the way that ordinaW wage increase would
have done.2
Ireland could achieve this same advantage of negotiating away some
of the inflationary pressures for wage increases and, because of the
projected budget surpluses, could do so without adding to employers’
costs of production. It is a unique opportunity to achieve a desirable
macroeconomic goal, give back extra tax reselwes to the taxpayers as a
whole, and start an important social policy that will help to deal with the
ageing of the population and the resulting rise in the relative number of
retirees.3
The special saving scheme in this year’s budget has some of the same
character - giving back funds in the form of a saving deposit rather than
2For more information on the Australian experience, see Malcolm Edey and John Simon
(1998), "Australia’s Retirement Income System," in M. Feldstein (editor) Privatizing Social
Security (Chicago: Chicago University Press).
3This idea is developed by my Harvard colleague John McHale in "Adding an Instrument to
Social Partnership: A Proposal for Deferred Compensation," published in the Quarterly
Economic Commel~tary, March (2001) of The Economic and Social Research Institute of
Ireland.
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as spendable cash. Bht contributions to Personal Retirement Accounts
would be better in being universal - i.e., going to everyone - and being
related to each individual’s pay.
A system of pe,xonal retirement accounts could, as I noted a moment
ago, be an alternative or a supplementto the National Pension Reserve
Fund. It would have the same advantages of prefunding future public
pension costs as the National Pension Reserve Fund and would avoid
some of the problems .of the Pension Reserve Fund, particularly the
potential politicisation of the Fund’s investment decisions. The experience
with state level pension funds in the United States shows that there is
often substantial pressure to invest these funds in local firms and to apply
"social" rather than commercial criteria to the investments. Shifting the
funcls to individual accounts would significantly reduce the risk of
politicisation because the individuals would protect the value of their own
assets.
Professor Phillip Lane has made an ingenious suggestion of an
alternative way of preventing the politicisation of the National Pension
Reserve Funct by requiring that it invest only in non-Irish assets. That
however entails a significant national cost in the form of forgone
investn-ient in the Irish economy. Since 1 per cent of GDP is to be
deposited in the NPRF each year, the immediate impact would be to
clivert savings equal to 1 per cent of GDP from domestic investment in
Ireland to investment in other economies. Over time, the cumulative
effect is quite large - reaching 42 per cent of GDP in less than 25 years
according to Professoi" Lane.
When funds are invested abroad, h’eland receives the interest and
dividends on those assets but forgoes the taxes collected on the resulting
corporate profits by the foreign government. For example, an investment
of $100 in United States equity would indirectly add $100 to the US
capital stock, producing additional national income in the United States of
about $10 a year. The US tax authorities at the federal, state and local
levels would capture about 40 per cent of this - i.e., about $4 - in taxes.
The remaining $6 would then come to Ireland in the form of the
dividends and the capital gains that reflect retained earnings. In contrast,
if those $100 were invested in Ireland, the return to the Irish nation -
including the taxes collected - would equal the full productivity of the
investment.
In a perfectly and completely integrated global capital market the
outflow of funds from Ireland would be offset by an equal inflow from
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the rest of the world because individual investors would shift funds
around the world to the places with the highest returns.
But experience, combined with statistical research,4 shows that the
global capital market is far more segmented than this. Saving tends to
remain in the countW of origin. Countries with higher saving rates have
higher investment rates. If the Irish government decides to export some of
its national saving by a rule requiring that the Pension Reserve Fund
invest only abroad, it cannot count on an offsetting inflow of funds from
abroad.5
There are other advantages of a system of individual accounts.
Individuals would have a stronger sense of security about their retirement
incomes, knowing that their accounts are personal property that cannot
be taken away. These accounts would permit individuals to tailor the risk-
reward ratio and their behaviour toward investments in industries like
alcohol and tobacco to their personal preferences. And the individual
accoun.ts would provide a framework that would encourage individuals to
accumulate additional funds on a voluntaW basis.
Although the National Pension Reserve Fund is intended to run down
after the year 2055 and eventually to be eliminated, there is no economic
reason to return in this way to a pure pay-as-you-go financing of public
pensions. Personal retirement accounts could instead be a permanent part
of financing future pension benefits.
The great advantage of including personal retirement accounts in the
system of financing social security pensions is the higher rate of return on
such investment-based accounts than in the traditional pay-as-you-go
accounts.
In the United States, President Bush has proposed such accounts and
announced that he will appoint a commission to work out the details.
Calculations by the US government’s actuaries show that, with the existing
pay-as-you-go system, the ageing of the population will raise the cost of
~See M. Feldstein and C. Horioka, "Domestic Savings and International Capital Flows,"
Economic Journal, June (1980) and M. Feldstein, "Tax Policy and International Capital
Flows," Weltwirtshaftsliches Archiv (1994).
SMore specifically, I interpret the Feldstein-Horioka finding as saying that over relatively long
periods of time private savers tend to keep their saving in the countw in which it originates.
We have too little experience with sustained budget surpluses to know how they affect
international capital flows. The Feldstein-Horioka logic suggests that if the surpluses are
used to finance the repurchase of domestically held government debt, the funds will also
remain at home. The key question for Ireland now is what happens if the government taxes
people and then sends the money abroad. I believe that it will lead to an increase in foreign
investment with little or no reflow back to Ireland. Foreign savers will continue to keep their
savings at home while Irish taxpayers will not borrow funds from the rest of the world to
offset the government outflow.
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providing the existing ratio of benefits to past earnings from the current
12 per cent of earnings to19 per cent of earnings. By shifting to a mixed
system, tile same level of benefits can be provided without any increase
in the 12 per cent pay-as-you-go tax if it is supplemented by personal
retirement account deposit equal m 2 per cent of earnings.6 That is, the 6
percentage point rise in the pay-as-you-go tax can be replaced by a 2 per
cent investment-based saving. By increasing the personal retirement
account deposit to 3 per cent of earnings, the long-term pay-as-you-go
tax rate can be reduced fi’om today’s 12 per cent to only 9 per cent,
leaving the combination of the pay-as-you-go tax and the 3 per cent PRA
deposits at today’s total of 12 per cent despite the 50 per cent rise in the
relative number of retirees.
A similar 3 to 1 advantage in likely to be available in Ireland, with
perhaps some difference to reflect differences in demographic conditions
and economic growth rates between h’eland and the United States.
There are many possible alternatives in the design of a universal
individual account investment based portion of the national retirement
system. Each countw must tailor the arrangements to its own conditions
and traditions. But it is an idea that is gaining acceptance around the
world in countries as different as Australia and China, as Sweden and
Mexico. I think it is an idea that deserves careful consideration here in
Ireland as well.
C’See M. Feldstein and A. Samwick, "Potential Effects of Two Percent Retirement Accounts,"
"Fax Notes, May 4 (1998) as updated in "New Estimates of Two Percent Personal Retirement
Accounts," available at www.nber.org.
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The Cost and Distribution of Tax
Expenditure on Occupational Pensions in
Ireland
Gerard Hughes*
Abstract: The pensions industlT’s argurnent that the favourable tax treatment of
occupational pension funds amounts to tax deferment rather than tax exemption
is evaluated using a net present value approach to estimate the cost of the tax
forgone in taxing employee pension contributions on a consumption tax basis,
rather than an income tax basis. It is shown that the net present value estimate
and the Revenue Commissioners cash flow estimate are in close agreement if tax
rates for workers and pensioners are the same and that the Revenue
Commissioners estimate is conservative if tax rates for pensioners are lower than
for workers. A comparison is made of the trend in the cost of tax expenditure on
occupational pensions since 1980 relative to the trend in the cost of direct
expenditure on social welfare pensions and it is shown that the cost of tax
expenditure has grown fronl around 10 per cent in 1980 to 66 per cent in 1997
and that the Exchequer support for the average participant in an occupational
scheme has risen from one-quarter to more than one-and-a-half times Exchequer
expenditure for the average participant in the social insurance scheme. The
assumption, therefore, that pensions can be provided at less cost to the Exchequer
through private financial institutions is questionable given existing pension tax
arrangements The distribution of the tax incentives provided for members of
occupational pension schemes is evaluated and it is shown that most of the
benefits accrue to those at the top of the income distribution.
* I am grateful to Paul Neenan of the Revenue Commissioners for providing estimates of the
cost of the tax exemption of the net income of approved superannuation funds and for
detailed explanations of how the estimates are derived, to my colleagues Brian Nolan and
Richard Layte for providing data from the ESRI Living in Ireland Su,’vey, and to Yung-Ping
Chen of the Gerontology Institute, University of Massachusetts, for supplying data on the
sources of retiren:ent income in the United States. I would like to thank Phil Agulnik, Bwn
Davies, Connell Fanning, Liam Gallagher, Coin: Kearney, John Fitz Gerald, Brian Nolan,
Adrian Sinfield, Jim Stewart, Brendan Walsh, Sue Ward and Brendan Whelan for comments
on earlier drafts presented at seminars in the Free University of Amsterdam, at the Annual
Meeting of the European Network for Research on Supplementary Pensions in October 1999,
in The Economic and Social Research Institute in November 1999, and in the Department of
Economics University College Cork in November 2000. None of the above are responsible
for the views expressed in the paper.
19
1. Introduction
There are two main reasons for favourable tax treatment of
occupational pensions. On social grounds, it is intended to encourage
people to make provision for their own retirement so that the State does
not have to bear all of the burden of providing income during old age)
On economic grounds, it is designed to encourage long-term saving by
increasing the rate of return thereby leading to an increase in investment
and the output of goods and services from which pensions can be paid in
tile future.2
Income tax reliefs on such items of personal expenditure as pension
contributions, health contributions, and mortgage repayments amount, in
effect, to expenditure programmes delivered through the tax system and
the term "tax expenditure" was introduced by Surrey (1973) to emphasise
this point. This view was adopted by the Commission on Taxation
(Ireland, 1982, p. 87) when it defined this type of tax support as:
... an exemption or relief which is not part of the essential
structure of the tax in question but [which] has been
introduced into the tax code for some extraneous reason,
e.g., in order to ease the burden of a particular type of
taxpayer or to provide an incentive to apply income in a
particular way or perhaps even to simplify administration.
The choice of the term "tax expenditure" indicates that
because these reliefs are not inherent in the structure of the
tax they are equivalent in terms of revenue forgone to direct
Government expenditure and should in general be judged
by the same criteria and subjected to the same review
process.
Since the early 1980s the Revenue Commissioners have published
annual estimates of the cost to the Exchequer of the tax support for
occupational pension schemes and of retiremen{ annuity premiums paid
by the self-employed. Although there is a common set of issues relating
to the taxation of pensions for employees and the self-employed this
paper will focus on the taxation of occupational pensions. The Revenue
Commissioners estimates show that the cost of the exemption of the net
See National Pensions Board (19885.
’ See Feldstein (1992 and 1998).
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income of approved superannuation funds has generally been one of the
largest items in the list of tax expenditures.3
Despite this, and the pension industw’s use of the tax favoured
treatment of occupational pensions as a major selling point, the
representative body of the industry, the Irish Association of Pension
Funds (IAPF), argues that the Exchequer ultimately gets back most of the
tax forgone on pension contributions and fund income through the
taxation of pension benefits. For example, the Irish Association of
Pension Funds (1998, p. 1) argues that "it is a common misconception
that pension funds are exempt from tax" because "they actually operate
on the basis of deferred taxation NOT no taxation" and that "the
exemptions are balanced by the eventual taxation of benefits (except, of
course, in relation to the lump sum) so the net effect is a tax deferral
rather than an outright exemption" (IAPF 1999, p. 1). The Pensions Board,
the government’s advisory body on pensions, appears to share this view
as it argues in its recent report (Pensions Board ’(1998 p. 146)) on
developing the national pension system that "the tax treatment of
pensions, other than lump sums, is essentially tax deferral" Its
predecessor, the National Pensions Board (1988), argued that "the present
tax treatment of pension funds is simple to understand and operate, is
broadly equitable and clearly acts as a major encouragement to the
establishment of funded occupational pension schemes."
Some economists lend support to the tax deferral view by arguing that
official tax expenditure estimates overstate the cost by using a single tax
year as the accounting period rather than the much longer period over
which pension costs and benefits accrue. This argument will be
considered in Section 3 after Section 2 provides an overview of how
pensions are taxed in Ireland compared with other OECD countries.
Section 4 examines how the aggregate cost of tax expenditure on
occupational pensions compares with government expenditure on social
welfare pensions. It also presents estimates of the average cost per
participant to the Exchequer of tax support for occupational pensions
relative to the average cost per participant of Exchequer expenditure on
social insurance pensions. Section 5 shows how the benefits of the tax
expenditure on employee contributions to occupational schemes are
distributed by income group and Section 6 presents conclusions and
official estimates of the cost of tax expenditures on pensions show that the same is true in
Australia (Knox, 1991); the United Kingdom (Sinfield, 2000); the United States (Munnell,
(1991) and other OECD countries (OECD, 1996)).
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makes some suggestions for making pension tax incentives more
equitable.
2. Pension Tax Regimes in OECD Countries
In common with all other OECD countries taxes are raised in Ireland by
taxing income rather than consumption. In broad terms, under a
comprehensive income tax pension contributions would be taxed (T), the
investment income and capital gains of the pension fund would be taxed
(T), and pension benefits would be exempt (E). Because of the economic
and social arguments for providing support for private pensions through
the tax system a departure from these arrangements is permitted and
pensions are taxed in a way which is consistent with the taxation of
saving under a consumption tax. Under a consumption tax regime
pension contributions would be exempt (E), investment income and
capital gains would be exempt (E), and pension benefits would be taxed
(see Dilnot (1992)). Where an income tax basis is used it is referred to as
a TI’E regime and where a consumption tax basis is used it is referred to
as an EET regime. Clearly, a consumption tax regime is more favourable
to saving than an income tax regime.
Table 1 provides a styilised summary of the regimes which are used to
tax occupa.tional pensions in OECD countries. From the first four columns
of the table it is evident that most countries allow pensions to be taxed
on a consumption tax basis. The main exceptions are New Zealand,
which uses an income tax basis, and some of the Nordic countries,
Austria, Australia, Iceland, and Japan which use a hybrid of the two.
Ahnost half of the countries in Table 1 allow some or all of the pension
benefit to be taken in the form of a lump sum payment on retirement.
Ireland and the United Kingdom stand out in this group as the only
countries which totally exempt lump sum benefits from tax. All of the
other countries which allow payment of lump sum benefits tax them at
stand’u’d or lower rates of tax. Income limits exist in the United Kingdom,
the United States and other OECD countries on the maximum benefit
which defined benefit schemes can provide and there are contribution
limits for defined contribution schemes, as there are in Ireland for both
defined benefit and defined contribution schemes.4 In 1997 the United
Kingcloln changed the tax treatment of Advanced Corporation Tax for tax
The income cap in the United Kingdom is currently £91,800 sterling; the maximum benefit
allowed in the United States in 1996 was $120,000.
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exempt investors such as pension schemes. This reduced the tax-favoured
position of pension funds relative to their position before the change.




Belgium E E T (t)
Canada E E -r Unavailable
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Norway E E T Unavailable
Portugal E E T (t)
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t) T UnavailableSweden
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New Zealand            iT           T . ...... ~E             T
Sources: OECD (1994), Whitehouse (1999), Hall (2000), Dilnot and Johnson (1993), and
Dalsgaard (2001).
Note: A small t indicates that the component is taxed at a lower rate than the standard rate
of income tax.
The tax incentives provided in different countries to encourage saving
through occupational or personal pensions were investigated some years
ago by the OECD (1994). It adapted a method of measuring incentives for
saving and investment, which King and Fullerton (1984) developed for
the corporate sector, to estimate the marginal effective tax rate on
different forms of household saving within the tax systems operating in
OECD countries in 1993. The tax rates are calculated for those paying at
the marginal rates applicable to the Average Production Worker and to
the highest earners. The results presented in Figures 1 and 2 show the
marginal effective tax rates on pensions for the two types of household
using the common OECD inflation rate of 3.7 per cent on the reference
date. They also assume that income levels during work and retirement are
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Figure 1: Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Pension Investment by Average






























































the same so pensions are not taxed at a lower rate during retirement.
Figure 1 shows that the marginal rate of tax on pension saving is zero for
those on average incomes in the United States, Spain, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Germany, France, and Canada. These countries therefore
tax pensions on a consumption tax basis. The marginal rates for Pom,lgal,
Austria, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Australia are negative. This
indicates that pensions are taxed in these countries in a regime which is
more generous than a consumption tax regime. The marginal rates for the
remaining countries are positive so their pension tax regimes are less
generous than a consumption tax with the least generous regimes existing
in the Nordic countries, Japan, Belgium and New Zealand where the
preferred approach is, or approximates to, a comprehensive income tax
regime.
Figure 2 shows that in countries in which the tax treatment of
pensions is more generous than a consumption tax regime top rate
taxpayers have a much greater incentive to invest their savings in
pensions than workers on average incomes. Figure 2 also shows that the
tax treatment of pensions for top rate taxpayers is more generous in
Ireland than in any other OECD countw.
3. Estimates of the Cost of Tax Reliefs on Occupational
Pensions
Pension schemes in Ireland receive favourable tax treatment by applying
to the Revenue Commissioners for "exempt approved status". To qualify
for this special status a scheme must be established under an irrevocable
trust, the assets of the fund must be held apart from the employer’s other
assets, and disposed of in accordance with a deed of trust. As none of the
government agencies responsible for the operation of occupational
pension schemes publish statistics on the financial operations of these
schemes, the Revenue Commissioners have based their estimates of the
cost of tax reliefs on different components of pension income flows on
whatever limited information is available from private sources. They have
published annual estimates of the cost of the tax relief on employee
contributions and of the cost of the exemption of the net income of
approved funds since 1980/81 and annual estimates of the cost of the tax
relief on employer contributions since 1993/94. They have also made
available unpublished estimates of the cost of the tax relief on lump sum
pension benefits for the years 1984/85 to 1989/90. The most
comprehensive estimate of the tax expenditure on occupational pensions
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is the value of the tax relief on the net income of approved
superannuation funds. This is based on total contributions by employers
and employees plus the investment income of the funds minus the
amount paid out in pension benefits and lump sums.
For the tax years 1981/82 to 1988/89 the estimate was derived by
multiplying the value of pension fund assets by an assumed rate of return
(6 per cent up to 1983/84 and 5 per cent thereafter) by the standard rate
of tax (35 per cent). For 1989/90 and 1990/91 the estimate was made by
using data from investment sul-veys carried out by the Irish Association of
Pension Funds on (1) pension fund assets, (2) net cash flow, and (3)
investment income. The value of pension assets was multiplied by an
assumed rate of return (5 per cent) and the product was added to the
value of the net cash flow. The total was then multiplied by the standard
rate of tax (29 per cent). For 1991/92, 1992/93, and 1993/94 IAPF data on
net cash flow and investment income were added and the result was
multiplied by the standard rate of tax in the relevant tax year (29 per cent
in 1991/92 and 27 per cent in 1992/93 and 1993/94). The IAPF investment
surveys did not provide information on investment income for 1994/95,
1996/97 or 1997/98 so the Revenue Commissioners reverted to their
earlier approach of multiplying the value of pension assets by an assumed
rate of return (5 per cent) and the standard rate of tax in the relevant
year.
Table 2 and Figure 3 show the Revenue Commissioners’ estimates of
the cost of the tax reliefs on (a) employee contributions from 1980/81 to
1997/98, (b) employer contributions from 1993/94 to 1997/98, and (c) the
net income of approved superannuation funds from 1980/81 to 1997/98.
The cost of the tax relief on employee contributions increased from IR£14
million in 1980/81 to IR£202 million in 1997/98. The cost of the relief on
employer contributions grew from IR£142 million in 1993/94 to IR£343
million in 1997/98. The cost of the relief on lump sum pension benefits
was about the same as the .cost of the employee contributions for the
years for which the data are available. For example, in 1984/85 the tax
forgone on the lump sum benefit amounted to IR£40 million while the tax
forgone on employee contributions was also IR£40 million and in 1988/89
the tax forgone on the lump sum amounted to IR£47 million while the tax
forgone on employee contributions was IR£50.3 million. Over the whole
period the cost of the tax relief on the net income of approved schemes
rose from IR£30 million to IR£648 million. Relative to GNP, as Figure 4
shows, the most comprehensive measure available from the Revenue
Commissioners of the cost of the favourable tax treatment of the net
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income of pension funds quadrupled from one-third of a percentage
point in 1980 to 1.4 per cent in 1997.
Table 2: Revenue Commissioners Estimates of the Cost of Tax Reliefs
on Employee Contributions, Employer Contributions, and on
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¯ ~40 0 ,
45.0
39:5
154.0            266.0         500.0
202.0        343.0 648.0 ,
Sources: An/u/a~ Report of the Revenue Commissionem 1981 to 1999.
Note: The increase in tile cost of the tax relief on the lump sum benefit in 1988/89 is
attributable to the voluntary early retirement scheme for the public service.
While "all countries reporting pensions tax expenditures currently do
so on a cash-flow basis" as the OECD (1996, p. 12) notes, such annual
estimates have been criticised by Dilnot and Johnson (1993) and Knox
(1991) on the ground that they do not take account of the tax revenue
which will accrue to the Exchequer in the future when pensions are paid.
A better way of estimating the annual cost to the Exchequer of tax
expenditure on pensions, as Munnell (1991, p. 395) has pointed out,
would be:
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Figure 3: Revenue Commissioners Estimates of the Cost of Occupational



















Figure 4: Tax Relief on Net Income of Approved Superannuation Funds as
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... the difference between (1) the present discounted value
of the revenue from current taxation of employer
contributions and pension fund earnings as they accrue over
the employee’s working life, and (2) the present discounted
value of the taxes collected when the employer’s
contributions and investment returns are taxable to the
employee after retirement.
Information is available from a pension coverage survey by Hughes and
Whelan (1996) which enables us to use Munnell’s method to estimate
how the cash flow estimate of the tax relief on employee contributions
compares with a net present value estimate.
In 1994/95 the Revenue Commissioners estimated that the cost of the
tax forgone on employee contributions, using the standard rate of tax of
27 pence, amounted to IR£87 million. This implies that total pension
contributions by employees were IR£322 million. The average effective
tax rate for retired households in the top half of the income distribution in
1994 was 12 pence.5 The average age of employees who were members
of occupational pension schemes in 1995 was 40; the normal pensionable
age was 62; and the average expectation of life at age 62 was just over 16
6years. The rate of return on pension assets is assunled to be 5 per cent,
the same as the rate used by the Revenue Commissioners. Some
economists argue that the graduated tax rate effect, which is a central
feature of a progressive income tax, should be ignored in estimating the
cost of pension tax expenditure so that only the cost of deferring tax for a
long period should enter into the calculation (see Bruce (1988, pp. 40-
41)). In order to separate the effect of tax deferral from differences in
worker and pensioner tax rates an estimate is also made on the
assunaption that workers and pensioners pay the same rate of tax, 27
pence in the pound.
Given these assumptions the net present value of the tax forgone
under the option of current taxation of employee contributions and
The average tax rate for retired households is derived from Table 14 of the Household
Budget Survey 1994-95 (Ireland, 1997). It may overstate the average effective tax rate for
pension beneficiaries. Although the majority of employees covered by an occupational
pension scheme are concentrated in the top half of the earnings distribution, data kindly
supplied by my colleague Richard Layte fi’om the 1997 wave of the ESRI Living in Ireland
Survey show that the incomes of households in which there were only elderly persons in
receipt of some income from an occupational pension scheme were significantly lower than
average household incomes and that about half of those in receipt of an occupational
pension were in the bottom half of the income distribution in 1997.
"These data are taken flom the 1995 pension survey by Hughes and Whelan (1996), revised
data supplied by them to the Pensions Board, and the Irish Life Table 1990-92.
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investment returns on these contributions and the net present value of the
option of taxing pension benefits when they become payable are shown
for different tax rates in Table 3. Figure 5 shows the income streams
which are being discounted under the two tax options in order to
evaluate the net present value of the tax forgone under each option. The
difference between these two options is a net present value estimate of
the revenue loss in 1994/95 of the deferral of tax until pensions are paid.
Table 3: Net Present Value Estimate of Difference Between Deferred (EET)
and Current (TTE) Taxation of Pensions Using Different Worker
and Pensioner Tax Rates
Tax Rates           ~ "
Worker = 27 pence; Pensioner= 12 pence










The estimates in Table 3 show that a net present value estimate of the
cost of tax relief on employee pension contributions in 1994/95 which
takes account only of the cost of tax deferral amounted to IR£94 million.
This is quite close to the Revenue Commissioners cash flow estimate of
IR~87 million. If the graduated tax rate effect is included the net present
value estimate gives a much higher figure, IR£130 million, than the cash
flow estimate. In either case there is a substantial revenue loss to the
Exchequer from the favourable tax treatment of occupational pension
funds. It is not, therefore, correct to argue that the tax arrangements for
pensions simply amount to a deferral of tax and that most of the forgone
revenue will be recovered by the Exchequer when pensions are paid.
The purpose of these estimates is not to produce a more precise
estimate of the cost of the tax expenditure on employee pension
contributions but, as Munnell (1991, p. 396) points out to:
... illustrate that the debate over the precise magnitude of
the tax expenditures is an unproductive digression that
diverts attention f,’om the important topic of whether the
favourable tax treatment accorded contributions to private
pension plans represents an efficient and equitable use of
scarce resources.
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Figure 5: Tax Flows under Income Tax (TTE) and Consumption Tax (EET)
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In h’eland debate has tended to focus on the official estimate of the cost
of the tax expenditure on occupational pensions and there has been little
discussion of other issues such as the relative costs of Exchequer support
for occupational and state pension schemes, the performance of tax
incentives in promoting pension cover, and the distribution of pension
tax benefits by income group. However, there is some information
available from reports on social welfare services, pension coverage
surveys, the reports of the Pensions Board, and the ESRI Living in Ireland
survey which throws some light on these issues.
4. Tax Expenditure on Occupational Pensions and Direct
Expenditure on Social Welfare Pensions
At the end of the 1980s it was realised that ageing of the population in
the early decades of the twenty-first centuW would increase the cost of
state pension schemes in many OECD countries. Governlnents began to
look for ways of changing the balance between state and private pension
provision in an attempt to avoid raising taxes in the future (see OECD
(1992)). As well as the problem of demographic ageing, Ireland faced
additional problems as its fiat-rate state pension was too low to
adequately replace income from work for most workers, it did not have a
state earnings-related pension scheme, and the coverage of occupational
pension schemes was low and veiT unevenly distributed across sectors
and occupations. The strategy recommended by the Pensions Board
(1998) to cope with these problems is to gradually raise the fiat-rate state
pension up to 34 per cent of average industrial earnings, to accumulate a
national pension reserve fund for investment in financial assets selected
from global financial markets, and to tW and increase pension coverage
on a voluntaW basis by providing access to Personal Retirement Savings
Accounts.7
The Pensions Board (1998, p. 109) noted that "the purpose of the fund
would be to place a ceiling on the additional Exchequer contribution
required for [social welfare pensions for] the foreseeable furore" and it
recommencled that the tax treatment of individual retirement savings
accounts should be more favourable than that for occupational pension
funds.
The policy message which comes through the various reports
published as part of the National Pensions Policy Initiative is that public
7 The target is to increase coverage from 54 per cent of those aged 30-65 at work in 1995 to
70 per cent over a period of ten years or more.
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pension schemes should be restricted to paying modest fiat-rate benefits
while the bulk of retirement pension provision should be provided on a
voluntaW basis by private financial institutions on the assumption that
publicly provided pensions are unaffordable in the long term, due to
population ageing, while privately provided pensions will be less costly
(see Pensions Board (1997 and 1998)). It did not provide any
comparisons of past trends in Exchequer expenditure on social welfare
pensions relative to tax expenditure on occupational pensions nor did it
include in its projections out to 2046 estimates of tax expenditure on
occupational pensions or on the Personal Retirement Savings Accounts
which it proposed should be introduced to increase pension coverage on
a voluntary basis. Although the Board’s strategy relies heavily on pension
tax incentives it does not consider how effective existing tax incentives
for occupational pensions have been in promoting coverage.
This section presents data relating to the trend in the cost of tax
expenditure on occupational pensions and to the trend in the coverage of
occupational pensions. These data raise some questions about the
effectiveness of tax incentives in promoting pension coverage and about
the assumption that privately provided pensions will be less costly in
terms of Exchequer support through the tax system than direct
government expenditure on social welfare pensions.
There are three social welfare pension schemes which have to be
considered: the Contributow Old Age Pension Scheme for which the
retirement age is 66, the Retirement Pension Scheme for which the
retirement age is 65, and the means-tested Non-Contributory Old Age
Pension Scheme for which the retirement age is 66. The Contributow Old
Age Pension Scheme is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis by Pay-Related
Social Insurance (PRSI) contributions by employers, employees, and the
self-employed while the Retirement Pension Scheme is financed by
similar contributions by employers and employees. Any shortfall between
income and expenditure on the two contributoW public pension schemes
is ,net by the state out of general taxation.
The main difference between the two contributory schemes is that a
retirement condition applies to the Retirement Pension up to age 66
whereas no such condition applies to the Contributory Old Age Pension
which becomes payable at age 66. Applicants for a non-contributory
pension have to satisfy a means-test to be eligible for a fiat-rate pension.
The basic non-contributory pension benefit for a single adult in May 2000
was IR£85.50 (= EUR 108.56) per week while the contributory and
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retirement pension benefit was IR£96.00 (EUR 121.89 per week or about
27 per cent and 31 per cent respectively of average industridlearnings.’    8
Tax expenditure on occupational pensions and direct expenditure on
social welfare pensions are compared in Table 4 and Figure 6 for the
period 1980-97. At the beginning of the period in 1980 tax expenditure on
occupational pensions amounted to 20 per cent of direct expenditure on
contributow social insurance pensions, IR£30 million versus IR£153
million. By the end of the period it had increased to 98 per cent, IR£648
nlillion versus IR£661 million. With respect to non-contributoW social
assistance pensions tax expenditure increased from 21 per cent in 1980
(IR£30 million versus IR£140 miUion) to over 200 per c e_n‘t in 1997 (Ii~£648
million versus IR£317 million).
In terms of the combined social welfare pension schemes the cost of
tax expenditure on occupational schemes increased from 10 per cent in
!980, IKg30 million versus IR£293 million, to over 66 per cent by 1997,
IR£648 million versus IR£978 million (see Figure 7). Given the average
rates of growth of tax and direct expenditure during the period 1987-97 it
would on!y require a few more ye.ars g.rQwtl! at these rates for the cost of
tax expenditure on occupational pensions to exceed the direct cost of
expenditure on social welfare pensions. The introduction of Personal
Retirement Savings Account (PRSA) with more favourable tax treatment
than occupational pension schemes, as recommended by the Pensions
Board, is likely to increase the cost of tax expenditure on pensions.
One effect of implementing this recommendation may be that
Exchequer support for social welfare pensions will be limited in the
future while the cost of its support for private pension schemes,
benefiting a much smaller number of people, will not be.
As only employees whose employers provide occupational pension
plans benefit from tax expenditure on these plans whereas all workers
ultimately benefit from social insurance pension expenditure it is
impol*ant to consider how many people benefit from the two kinds of
expenditure and to what extent they benefit on average.
8 From May 2001 the non-contributory pension for a single adult is £95.50 (EUR 121.25) and
the contributory pension is £106.000 (EUR 134.59).
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Table 4: Direct Expenditure on State Pensions, Tax Expenditure on
Occupational Pensions and Direct Expenditure as Per Cent of Tax
Expenditure on Pensions, 1980-97
Year Direct Direct Tax




Direct Tax Expenditure on
Expenditure on Occ. Pensions as
Contributory Non- Per Cent of Direct
Old Age Contributory Exp. On State
Pension & Old Age Pensions
Retirement Pension
Pension
£ million Per Cent
1980 153.0 140.2 293.2 30.0 10.2
1981 197.5 1:76.4 373.9 35.0 9.4
1982 259.3 225.0 484.3 40.0 8.3
1983 293.9 246.5 540.4 42.0 7.8
1984 325.9 264.1 590.0 45.0 7.6
1985 351,7 273.5 625.2 53.0 8.5
1986 374.5 283.9 658.4 62.0 9.4
1987 399.5 291.2 690.7 80.0 11.6
1988 417.2 291.8 709.0 89.0 12.6
!989 439.0 293.8 732.8 130.0 17.7
1£90 464.9 301.5 766.4 200.0 26.1
1991 493.9 308.8 802.7 216.0 26.9
1992 529.5 317.2 846.7 189.0 22.3
1993 546.3 318.4 864.7 245.2 28.4
1994 569.0 319.1 888.’1 344.0 38.7
1995 597.2 308.8 906.0 399.0 44.0
1996 626.0 310.3 936.3 500.0 53.4
1997 661,2 316.8 978.0 648.0 66.3
Sources.. Anmlal Report of the Reve,~ue Commissioners 1981 to 1999, Statistical hTJ’ormation
on Social Welfare Services 1983 to 1997, and Special Tabulation from the Revenue
Commissioners.
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Figure 6: Direct Expenditure on Social Insurance and Social Assistance
Pensions and Tax Expenditure on Occupational Pensions,
1980-97
okt .z/
i coAP+ .. /
iit . . , " "
Year
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Figure 7: Tax Expenditure on Occupational Pensions as a Percentage of










Beneficiaries of State Expenditure on Pensions
The number of people insured for all social insurance benefits and the
number of members of occupational pension schemes are shown in Table
5 and Figure 8 and the coverage rates are shown in Figure 9. The number
of social insurance and social assistance pensioners and occupational
pensioners are graphed in Figure 10.
The effects of policy decisions to bring the Irish social welfare system
more into line with the approach in most countries in the European
Union by relying to a greater extent on social insurance than social
assistance is evident fl’om the growth in the population insured for all
benefits, the increase in the number of contributoW old age pensioners,
and tim reductio!! in the number of no!~-contributoW old age pensioners.
The number insured for all benefits increased by 82 per cent between
1980 and 1998 while the number at work during this period grew by 29
per cent. Consequently, the percentage of those at work insured for all
benefits increased from 75 per cent to 100 per cent over the period. The
total number of State pensioners remained fairly stable at between
230,000 to 240,000 but the number of social insurance pensioners
increased from 97,000 to 147,000 while the number of social assistance
pensioners fell from 130,000 to 96,000. Consequently, 60 per cent of
pensioners received a social insurance pension in 1998 compared with 43
per cent in 1980.
Criteria by which to judge whether Exchequer support for
occupationa! pensions is achieving its goals are: what percentage of those
at work are covered by such schemes and is the coverage rate increasing
over time? The last column in Table 5 shows that in 1985 only a minoriW
of those at work, 44 per cent, were members of occupational pension
schemes and that the coverage rate fell by 8 percentage points thereafter
to 36 per cent in 1998. Thus, despite the continuing substantial support
provided through the tax system for occupational pension schemes they
fail to provicle pension cover for the majority of the working population
and they are failing to maintain coverage rates attained in the past when
the working population was much smaller.
4O
Figure 8: Coverage of Contributory Old Age Pension Schemes and
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Figure 9: Coverage Rate of Contributory Old Age Pension Schemes and










Note: The percentage insured for Contributory and Retirement Pensions can exceed 100
per cent of the labour force as it includes persons in receipt of credited contributions.
[m -- O¢¢.Pen.~COAP&Rpl
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Figure 10: Number of Contributory and Non-Contributory Old Age
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Table 5: Insured Population, Contributory Old Age and Retirement
Pensioners, Members of Occupational Pension Schemes and
Occupational Pensioners, 1980-96
Year Insured for All Social Social Members of Occupational
Benefits Insurance Assistance Occupational Pensioners
. Pensioners Pensioners Schemes
(COAP/RP) (NCOAP)
Number
864,000 97,382 130;077 ’
944,000 99,494 129;331 -
955,000 101,665 129,495 - -
963,000 104,449 128,538
951,000 106,224 !28,270 1
~5,000 108,892 126,058 4761200- ¯ 9i;700
961 790 111,B09 124,913
952,390 115,214 124,419
964,310 117,769 122;681 -
937.100 12(3,607. 120,632 "
925,600 122,945 118,223 .     -




















930,000 127,896     113,555 438,007. -
968,300 130,261     111,011 " 467,890 "    -
1,190,670 1.33,031 108,301 476,384
1,279,600 134,940 : 102,984 476600 ,~I0:
1,394~400 137,728 101,624 501,400:. ,
1,505,300 141,815- 98,835 519,469"     .-
1,574,300 147,022 95,890 534,198~ ~-
Sottrces: Statistical htJbtvnation on Social Welfare Selwices, 1997, 1996, 1995, 1993, 1992,
1991, and 1990; Hughes (1994, Table 9) and Hughes and Whelan (1996); The
Pe/tsio~ts Board Anmtal Repot1 & Accottnts, 1991 to 1997.
Note: The increase in the insured population between 1980 and 1981 may be due to a
change in the way in which the data are classified. The membership figures for
occupational pension schemes and the number of occupational pensioners in 1985
and 1995 are based on survey data in Hughes and Whelan (1996) and the
membership figt, res for the remaining years are taken from the Annual Reports of
the Pensions Board.
Putting information on the number of workers covered by social
insurance and occupational schemes and the number receiving pensions
together with the data on the cost of government expenditures on social
insurance pensions and of tax expenditure on occupational pensions we
provide estimates in Table 6 of the level and trend in support provided by
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the Exchequer for the average participant in each type of scheme, where
the number of participants is equal to the number of employees in the
scheme plus the number of pensioners receiving benefits from it. The
table shows that in 1985 Exchequer support for the average participant in
an occupational pension scheme amounted to about a quarter as 1-nuch as
was provided to the average participant in the s6cial insurance schemes.
Over the next ten years however Exchequer support for occupational
schemes grew yew strongly so that in 1995 almost two-thirds more was
provided for the average participant in an occupational scheme compared
with the average participant in a social insurance scheme.9
Table 6: Average Direct Expenditure Per Participant on Social Insurance
Pensions and Average Tax Expenditure Per Participant on
Occupational Pensions in 1985 and 1995
Social Insurance OccuPational, , ~ Ratio of Tax
ExPenditure to DirectPensions Pensions
~ ~" Expenditure ’(COAP & RP) ¯
1985 327 93 0127 ,
1995 422 :, 688 ¯ ’ ’ , ,1.63
Sources.. See text.
Despite the greater level of support provided for the average
participant in an occupational scheme, it is striking that the great majority
of pensioners remain dependent on social welfare pensions for an
income during retirement. Table 7 compares the position in Ireland and
the United States. Almost all pensioners in both countries receive a social
welfare or social security pension and the amount they receive provides
the largest component of their income in retirement. In addition the
sources of income in retirement in the two countries are not veW different
with the exception of asset income.
’) Most occupational.pension schemes are integrated with the social insurance scheme to
take account of the fact that all eligible employees will ultimately receive a social insurance
pension. If this were allowed for, participants in occupational pension schemes would
benefit from Exchequer support to an even greater extent than is shown in Table 6.
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Table 7: Percentage of those Aged 65 and Over Having Income from
Various Sources in Ireland and the United States in 1995
Source of Ireland . united States
Income Per Cent with Per Cent























Sources: Hughes and Whehm (1996, Table 3.4); Chen (1996).
Ill view of the trend in tax expenditure and direct expenditure by the
Exchequer on pensions and the much greater support which is now
being provided by the Exchequer for the average participant in an
occupational pension scheme, it is questionable if pensions provided by
private financial iiastitutions are less costly to the Exchequer, under
existing pension tax arrangements, than publicly provided pensions.1°
Since the Pensions Board’s strategy for developing the pension system
was published in 1998 some proposals have emerged for further
development of the system." These proposals and the Board’s own
proposals all have implications for Exchequer expenditure and it is
important that all of the costs, including Exchequer costs, should be taken
into account when evaluating them.
5. Distribution of Tax Expenditure on Occupational Pensions
With the reduction in recent years of mortgage interest tax relief the tax
exemption of the net income of approved superannuation funds is now
the most costly item in the Revenue Commissioners’ list of income tax
reliefs./2 Individual tax payers are obliged to include details on their
annual income tax return of mortgage interest payments for which they
are claiming tax reliefs. Consequently, the Revenue Commissioners have
information on the distribution of these tax reliefs by income class.
to The representative of the Minister for Finance on the Pensions Board noted in the
Pensions Board (1998, p. 118) report that "despite the fact that a central element of the
initiative was to secure substantially greater supplementaW pension coverage, the scenario
emerging for dm next 50 years or so shows an increased rather than any diminishing
,elhmce on the Exchequer to meet pension requirements. This would be particularly the
case if the present pay-as-you-go system continues to apply."
~’ See Callender (2000) and McHale (2000).
~2 St,’uctural reliefs are assumed to be part of the benchmark tax system.
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Unfortunately, because of the way in which the reliefs on occupational
pension contributions and pension fund income are given there is no
official information on how much tax relief different interest groups claim
for contributions to occupational pension funds. However, a household
survey carried out by the ESRI in 1994 (see Callan, Nolan, Whelan,
Whelan, and Williams, (1996)) contains information on weekly gross
earnings of employees who are members of any type of pension scheme.
Employees are ranked in Table 8 and Figure 11 in deciles by level of
earnings.
Table 8: Employees Ranked by Weekly Gross Earnings Showing the












Source: ESRI Living in Ireland Survey 1994.
The table shows that coverage of occupational pension schemes is
virtually complete for the top three deciles; reasonably good for middle
income employees in the fifth, sixth, and seventh deciles with 50 to 70
per cent having a pension entitlement; rather poor for low income
employees in the second, third, and fourth deciles with only 10 to 35 per
cent having an entitlement, and virtually non-existent for the bottom
income decile)~ This pattern of occupational pension coverage is vew
striking. It has been explained by Hughes and Nolan (1999) in terms of a
segmented labour market model in which good fringe benefits are offered
by employers as part of the total compensation package for moderate to
high paying jobs to attract and hold onto well qualified employees while
fringe benefits are not part of the compensation package for low paying
jobs as there is generally an excess supply of poorly qualified job
applicants.
,3 The pattern is similar when pension coverage rates are estimated by age group. For
example, the coverage rate for those under 30 was 1.3 per cent for the first decile and 79
per cent for the 10"’ decile.
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The only data available to assess the distribution of tax support for
occupational pensions come from the ESRI Living in Ireland Survey. It
contains information on the size of the employee contribution to
occupational pension schemes but unfortunately not on the employer
contribution. An estimate of the value of the tax relief given to employees
can be derived by income class which will show whether the tax support
provided for employee contributions is progressive, proportional, or
regressive relative to income. The estimates of the value of the tax
expenditure as a percentage of income take account of marital status, the
standard personal allowances, and the relevant marginal tax rates. The
aggregate value of pension contributions and of the tax relief are
averaged across everyone in the income class whether they make a
pension contribution or not. Figure 12 shows that tax support for
employee contributions to occupational pensions is regressive. The value
of the relief expressed as a percentage of weekly income increases from
less than 0.06 per cent at the bottom of the income distribution to around
0.8 per cent in the middle and to about 1.6 per cent at the .top. Thus,
those on incomes of less than IR£41.00 per week receive hardly any
bene.fit from the tax relief on occupational pension contributions while
those earning over IR£720 per week benefit to the extent of 1.6 per cent
of their weekly income. In terms of the total value of the tax relief which
is given, the top 20 per cent of employee taxpayers receive more than 60
per cent of the tax expenditure while the bottom 20 per cent receive less
than 0.5 per cent of it. The concentration of the benefits on the higher
paid is similar to the picture found by the OECD (1994) for the United
States and the Netherlands in an analysis of the distribution of their
pension tax expenditures but different from the outcome in Australia and
the United Kingdom where the benefits are more evenly spread across
the income distribution (see Figure 13 for the Irish data and Figure 14 for
the UK and the US). The distribution of pension tax expenditures in
Ireland is another example of the "upside-down" nature of tax
expenditures whereby, as Sinfield,(1997, p. 120) notes:
The benefit is greater, the higher the income and the higher
the marginal tax rate which is avoided as a result of the tax
mechanism. The greatest beneficiaries are those who have
the least needs by any measure used in social policy
analysis.
There are two main reasons for this regressivity, as Agulnik and Le
Grand (1998) point out. The first is that membership of occupational
pension schemes increases strongly with income. The second is that the
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tax relief is given at the marginal rate of tax. Hence, the value of the tax
relief as a percentage of income rises as income rises. The interaction of
these two factors results in a steady increase in the absolute value of the
tax relief on occupational pension contributions as the absolute value of
income rises.
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
The evidence presented in this paper shows that arguments that official
estimates overstate the cost of tax expenditure on occupational pensions
and that the Exchequer will get back most of the tax forgone on pension
contributions and fund income are not well founded: the Revenue
Commissioners’ estimate of the cost of tax expenditure on employee
pension contributions is almost the same as a net present value estimate
which takes account of the tax forgone through taxation on a
consumption tax rather than an income tax basis and the favourable tax
treatment of occupational pensions cost the Exchequer nearly IR£650
million in forgone revenue and amounted to almost 1.5 per cent of GNP
in 1997.
Tim assumptions that increases in Exchequer expenditure on social
welfare pensions cannot be afforded in the long term, due to ageing of
the population, and that supplementaw pensions can be provided at less
cost to the Exchequer through private financial institutions are
questionable. Tax expenditure on occupational pensions now amounts to
two-thirds of government expenditure on social welfare pensions and it
will exceed direct expenditure in a few years time if present trends
continue. As less than half as many people benefit fl"onl tax expenditure
on occupational pensions as benefit from direct expenditure on social
insurance pensions, far more is now provided through the tax system for
the average participant in an occupational scheme than for the average
participant in the social insurance scheme.
Examination of the level and trend in relation to the coverage of
occupational pension schemes suggests that tax incentives have failed to
provide pension coverage for a majority of workers or even to maintain
coverage rates at the level attained in the past when the working
population was much smaller.
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Figure 13: Distribution of Tax Expenditure on Employee Occupational





Figure 14: Distribution of Pension and Insurance Income Subject to Tax in
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Finally, the evidence from the Living in Ireland Survey shows that the
argunlent that the present tax treatment of occupational pensions is
broadly equitable is incorrect as most of the benefit of tax expenditure on
occupational pensions is concentrated at the upper end of the income
distribution.
These results have some implications for the taxation of occupational
pensions and for the tax arrangements proposed for Personal Retirement
Savings Accounts. With only just over a third of employees covered by
occupational plans all taxpayers must pay higher taxes because of the
revenue forgone due to the tax incentives for pensions. This inequiW
could be addressed by imposing restrictions on the tax incentives to
target them on middle and lower income earners who need them most.
There are examples from other OECD countries of how greater equity can
be introduced into pension tax arrangements by, for example, phasing
out the tax free lump sum, introducing an income cap on pension
benefits, and ta:ging the returns on pension investments.
It has been recommended by the Pensions Board that Personal
Retirement Savings Accounts should be made available to everybody
whether they belong to an occupational pension scheme or not and that
there should be no earnings cap whereby earnings in excess of the cap
would not qualify for tax reliefs. If they are made available in this form,
experience with Individual Retirement Accounts in the United States and
Personal Pension Plans in the United Kingdom suggests that take-up is
likely to be nmch greater by higher income earners than by middle and
lower income earners.’’* There is a danger, therefore, that the introduction
of individual retirement saving accounts ,nay accentuate inequities in the
pension system by providing another tax favoured savings vehicle for
people who already have adequate pension cover. To avoid this danger,
consideration should be given to experience in the United States which
has changed the tax arrangements for Individual Retirement Accounts
several times to try and target the tax incentives on middle and lower
income earners.’5
’~ See Sabelhaus (1996) for evidence for the US and Banks, Dilnot, and Tanner (1997) for the
UK.
~5 Individual Retirement Accounts in the United States were originally introduced in 1974 for
workers who did not have occupational pension cover. In 1981 they were extended to all
wo,’kers and in 1986 the tax deduction was restricted for workers with occupational cover to
those with incomes below specified levels. In 1997 a maximum contribution, eligible for tax
relief, of up lo $2,000 per annum was allowed. The amount that was tax deductible varied
according to the worker’s income tax status, income, and pension coverage status and
contributions could only be made out of earned income (see Employee Benefit Research
Institute (1997, Ch. 16)).
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The National Pensions Reserve Fund:
Pitfalls and Opportunities
Philip R. Lane
Abstract: This paper analyses some key issues concerning the new National
Pensions Reserve Fund. We briefly review tim basic demographic and economic
t,’ends that motivate the establishment of the Fund. We consider the pitfalls facing
the operation of the Fund and argue that a complete ban on domestic investment
would minimise the politicisation problem. At least initially, the Fund should
adopt an aggressive investment strategy, with a large equity allocation. We further
argue that asset allocation should take into account the co-variation of returns
with domestic macroeconomic and fiscal variables. Finally, we discuss the
organisational structure of the Fund and its implications for optimal performance.
1. Introduction
The National Pensions Reserve Fund Act 2000 is a remarkable and
innovative piece of economic legislation.~ The current government has
committed all future governments until 2055 to set aside at least 1 per
cent of GNP each year. Moreover, the proceeds from the Telecom Eireann
privatisation have also been added to the fund, as may the revenues from
future sales of State assets. Over time, the Fund will become by far the
largest investment institution in the countw: a reasonable estimate is that
size of the Fund will be equivalent to 42 per cent of GNP by 2025
(Corrigan, 2000).
The motivation for the National Pensions Reserve Fund (hereafter the
Funcl) is the projected future increase in public pensions expenditure.2 In
the absence of pre-funding, future taxes would have to increase in order
to maintain the level of pensions benefits. From an efficiency perspective,
the prospect of a rising tax profile is undesirable, since it distorts
intertemporal decisions. The alternative to increasing taxes would be to
raise contributions, cut benefits and/or increase the retirement age.
’ See also Honohan and Lane (2000a), Lane (1999a, 1999b, 2000a) and Whelan (2001) for
other commentaries on the new Fund.
" See Commission on Public Sector Pensions Report (2000) and Department of Finance
(1998, 1999).
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Although these reforms may be part of the overall policy approach to an
ageing society, pre-funding expands the political options in pensions
reform.
This paper addresses some issues concerning the new Fund. We do
not discuss whether the Fund is desirable per se. Rather, our intention is
to probe the "pitfalls and opportunities" in the operation of the Fund. An
open and informed public debate is vital if the Fund is to be politically
sustainable: legislation can be amended and undone, so it is important to
build widespread public support for the Fund if it is to properly perform
its functions.
This paper deals solely with the pre-funding of social welfare and
public sector pensions. Clearly, this is only a small subset of the full range
of issues posed by the prospect of an ageing population. Other important
policy issues include: raising the retirement age; long-term immigration
policy; an EU federal fiscal system (will Ireland pay the pensions of
retired workers in older continental European societies?); promoting
pensions in the private sector; the financing of health care for the elderly;
indexation rules (CPI versus earnings) for pensions; and increasing the
fertility rate. The potential impact on the political system of inter-
generational conflict regarding pensions policy is also a fascinating topic.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with these problems.3
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews
the basic demographic and economic trends that motivate the
establishment of the Fund. Section 3 discusses some challenges facing the
Fund. The Fund’s investment strategy is analysed in Section 4 and some
management principles are laid out in Section 5. Section 6 offers some
concluding remarks.
2. Basic Trends
Ireland currently has extremely favourable demographics. Figure i shows
the distribution of age cohorts in the working-age population: in the near
term, it is clear that the burden of extra retirees will be relatively light.
However, Figures 2 and 3 and Table 1 capture the underlying
motivation for establishing the Fund. The ratio of retirees to workers is
projected to sharply rise during 2020-2050. In Ireland, the process is
"back-loaded", with the ratio rising most sharply towards the end of this
interval. The budgetaw impact is that public pensions expenditure is
3 See Colnmission on Public Sector Pensions Report (2000) and Feldstein and Siebert (2001)
for analysis of some of these issues.
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projected to almost double from 4.6 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 9.0 per
cent in 2050.*
The projected net increase in public pensions expenditure - 4.4 per
cent of GDP (5.1 per cent of GNP) - is considerable. This is in the mid- to
upper- range for EU countries and is equivalent to almost doubling public
education spending or raising income tax revenues by 42 per cent.
Although Table 1 shows that the scale of the pensions problem is
currently far smaller in Ireland than in several continental European
countries, the projected increase in public pensions expenditure is the
most relevant criterion in determining the importance of pre-funding. On
this count, Ireland is in the mid- to upper- range for EU countries.
Moreover, the fact that tile Irish ageing problem kicks in at a later date
than elsewhere provides a greater rationale for pre-funding, since returns
can accumulate over a longer time period.
Finally, as is vividly illustrated in Figure 4, the dramatic improvement
in the public finances means that the political climate for such long-term
policies is unusually benign.
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Sottrce: UN Demographic Yearbook (2000). Data are for 1996.
4 This is a baseline projection. There is considerable uncertainty about these projections
which depend on guesses about fertility rates, migration, productivity growth and benefits
levels.
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Table 1: Pension Expenditure Projections
¯
" : 2000 " , , 2030
Ireland ¯ ’ ¯ " " 4.6 ’,," "7 6 ’ ~ ’
UK , ¯ ’. ;5.1 ’ " "; 4:7 " ~ ~, ,"
France " , ..... 12.1. ,, " 16’ ....... i5
Italy " 14.2, " i59
Germany 10.3, " " 13:2oi .....
Spain .... 9.4 " - 12.9
poduga
- ..... 9.8 ’ ’ 16 ’
Source: European Conlmission (2000), Table 6.1.1.
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3. Some Pitfalls
In this section, we first discuss some potential pitfalls facing the
Commission in fulfilling its responsibilities. We also discuss the role of the
Fund in the broader public finances.
3.1 The Politicisation of Investment
There is a natural concern that state ownership of private assets can lead
to an undesirable politicisation of the investment process.
Assar Lindbeck (2000) cautions against a state-owned investnlent fund
There is a serious risk that future politicians will use
government-controlled pension funds to allocate financial
funds to those parts of the countW where it is particularly
important to buy votes. Politicians might also start using the
voting rights in firms, based on share holdings, to exert
influence within firms. It is na’ive to think that authorities can
create government-controlled pension funds, i.e., nationalize
a large part of share ownership, witfiout a severe risk that
some politicians - sooner or later - will use these funds to
buy votes or to exert direct power over firms, or both.
Alan Greenspan (2001) similarly has raised doubts about the
desirability of state ownership of private assets:
I believe, as I have noted in the past, that the federal
government should eschew private asset accumulation
because it would be exceptionally difficult to insulate the
government’s investment decisions from political pressures.
Thus, over time, having the federal government hold
significant amounts of private assets would risk sub-optimal
performance by our capital markets, diminished economic
efficiency, and lower overall standards of living than would
be achieved otherwise.
There is considerable empirical evidence of political interference in
the operation of state investment funds. Iglesias and Palacios (2000)
document that returns can be inversely related to the degree of political
interference. Sorensen et al. (2001) show that reserve funds are often
raided by US states during recessions when local tax revenues are under
pressure.
In response to such concerns, the government has delegated
responsibility for the fund to an independent Commission. However, this
does not provide complete insulation, since the commissioners will be
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politically appointed to temporaW contracts and, as always, ultimate
responsibiliW lies with the Minister for Finance and the Cabinet. Indeed,
according to recent media reports, there has already been an attempt by a
veW large public company in Ireland to lobby for an 2,900 per cent over-
weighting of Irish equities in the Fund’s portfolio (Suiter, 2001).5
One potential manifestation of the politicisation problem is in battles
for corporate control. Although Section 15 of the Act prohibits the Fund
from seeking to take control of a firm, much power can be exercised
below this threshold: for instance, the Fund could be a key "swing" voter
in a control contest between two other parties. More generally, if the
Fund held domestic investment positions, asset sales could attract much
criticism as being anti-patriotic.
There is a simple way to minimise the risk of politicisation: prohibit
any investment in Irish assets. Ireland represents only a trivial fraction of
world market capitalisation, so that a ban on Irish assets would not
seriously constrain the range of feasible investments for the Fund. In this
way, Ireland is more fortunate than the United States: it would not be
feasible for the United States to accumulate a significant state investment
f\md composed purely of overseas assets.
The Act partially acknowledges this problem by prohibiting the Fund
from holding Irish government bonds. However, the Fund is pem~itted to
purchase any other kind of Irish asset: Irish corporate bonds, Irish
publicly-traded equities, Irish private equity, Irish venture capital and Irish
property.
By rather having a complete legislative bar on domestic assets, the
commissioners would be protected from pressure to invest at home.
Unfotxunately, the Act does not incorporate this restriction.
3.2 A n Eth ical Investment Policy?
The legislation requires the Fund to maximise returns according to strictly
commercial criteria. As such, there is no bar on the Fund holding shares
in tobacco or alcohol companies or in firms engaging in environmentally-
unfriendly activities. If there are to be ethical constraints on investment
policy, these should be specified in the legislation: it would be
undesirable and indeed illegal for the Fund’s Commissioners to make
such essentially political decisions. The lack of a political debate on this
Acco,’ding to the report, the Smurfit Group requested an Irish equity allocation of 15 per
cent, although the Irish ma,-ket is only 0.5 per cent of world equity capitalisation.
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question may prove to be unwise, if lobbying by activist groups places
pressure on the government to amend the legislation in future years.
3.3 Budgetary Implications
Payments into the Fund have no impact on the General Government
Surplus (GGS) figures: it is merely a transaction within the general
government sector. The converse is that alternative strategies - such as
paying down the public debt - would improve the GGS surplus. During
the current period of booming tax revenues, it may well be an astute
domestic political strategy to reduce the headline GGS surplus figure by
making payments into the Fund rather than allocating the revenues to
alternative uses. However, this strategy is potentially a source of
confusion to external assessors that employ the GGS surplus as the
indicator of fiscal prudence.
The commitment to make payments into the Fund regardless of
budgetary conditions will place pressure on the Minister of Finance
during tough fiscal times. Consider a scenario in which Ireland is just
hitting the 3 per cent deficit/GDP ratio, that is red marked in the Growth
and Stability Pact: the government may be forced into larger tax increases
or more severe public expenditure cuts by the fact that the Fund payment
is ring-fenced. Indeed, this is the veW reason why the commitment was
written into the legislation but it will be interesting to see if this part of
the Act will remain unchanged throughout the projected life of the Fund.
There is a very important second dimension to the relation between
the Fund and the budgetaW position. Only the investment income and
not the capital gains/losses generated by the Fund is counted as part of
the GGS.
There are two problems here. First, investment income will inevitably
fluctuate on a year-to-year basis, depending on shifts in world interest
rates, equity dividend payments and currency movements. This will
induce instability in the GGS, which ,nay be especially costly if it leads to
a violation of the 3 per cent deficit rule.
Second, the measured GGS will be larger, the more returns on the
Fund take the form of investment income rather than capital gains. In this
way, the Fund’s Commissioners ,nay face implicit pressure from a
government that is twing to improve the GGS numbers to bias its
portfolio towards income-generating assets.
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3.4 The One Per Cent Rule
According to the legislation, one per cent of GNP will be paid into the
Fund each year. This sum is intended to only partially pre-fund
anticipated future pension liabilities.
The one per cent rule has the characteristic of an "automatic
stabiliser": more will be paid into the Fund when the economy is growing
quickly than during a slowdown. It is an open question whether this is an
optimal rule in terms of cyclical stabilisation. In Ireland, tax revenue
elasticities with respect to GNP are typically greater than unity. On this
basis, a rule that specified a greater percentage would be paid into the
Fund during upturns and a smaller percentage during downtums may
have better stabilisation properties. However, the one per cent rule has
the considerable merits of simplicity and clarity. Moreover, a cyclically-
adjusted rule would require a reliable decomposition between cycles and
trends in output growth. This is a notoriously difficult problem, especially
for a small open economy with an elastic international supply of labour
and capital.
3.5 The Central Bank Investment Fund
The government already has a very substantial investment fund. This is
the fund consisting of the former reserve assets of the Central Bank of
Ireland) Since Ireland joined EMU in 1999, its need to hold foreign
exchange reserves has sharply diminished and the financial assets of the
Central Bank now far exceed the amount it is required to hold under its
EMU obligations as a member of the European System of Central Banks.
The Central Bank assets generated net interest income of 240 million in
1999 and unrealised capital gains of 648.2 million] As such, the size of
the Central Bank fund will be much larger than the new Fund, at least for
the next few years.
Since the "excess" funds of the Central Bank are not required for
currency management, the presumable objective is to conditionally
maxilnise the investment return on these funds.8 As such, the goal is quite
similar to that of the new Fund, with the potential exception of a different
investment horizon: the Central Bank remits investment income to the
~’ These assets have been accumulated through seigniorage and capital gains on investments.7 See Central Bank of Ireland Annual Report (1999).
" Indeed, this is one of the clear and unambiguous gains from EMU: a decline in the need to
hold state assets in tile form of low-return liquid positions. There are some ECB constraints
on tile management of these funds.
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Minister of Finance on a contemporaneous basis whereas there is no
drawdown from the Fund until 2025.
From a consolidated government balance sheet perspective, it would
be optimal to co-ordinate the investment strategies of the Central Bank
and the new Fund. One option is to transfer the Bank’s excess assets to
the new Fund. However, that step would eliminate one source of current
income for the Minister of Finance. Another is for an exchange of
information between the Bank and the new Commission or the National
TreasuW Management Agency (NTMA): however, it is not clear which
should be the "lead" party in this relationship. A coherent policy
statement on the desired role of the Bank’s excess assets is required to
properly address these questions. The impending reorganisation of the
Central Bank may provide a useful opportunity in this regard.
3.6 Social Welfare Pensions versus Public Sector Pensions
The objective of the Fund is to partly pre-fund future social welfare and
public sector pension liabilities. The legislation leaves open the possibility
of creating two separate Funds in the future to reflect these two functions.
In general, there are clear distinctions between the two types of pension
liabilities. The social welfare pension is not related to earnings and is
essentially a minimal anti-poverty measure. As such, maintaining an
adequate social welfare pension (at least as currently designed) will
plausibly always be the responsibility of the state and the social welfare
pension fund is essentially just a means for the government to efficiently
smooth revenue streams.
The pensions of public sector workers rather are much more similar to
a standard defined-benefit private pensions scheme. For the latter group,
one can think of alternative ways to pre-fund pensions and to organise
the management of the fund. For instance, a defined contribution scheme
could be envisaged for public sector workers and even individual
retirement accounts, with each employee making a personal choice re
risk/return tradeoffs and the design of her personal retirement fund. Even
under a model in which the public sector employee fund were
collectively invested, its managers would be much more directly
accountable to the public sector workforce, which is a different design to
the current set-up for the Fund.
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4. The Investment Strategy for the Fund
The objective of the Fund is to meet
... as much as possible of the cost to the Exchequer of social
welfare pensions and public sector pensions to be paid from
the year 2025 until the year 2055 ... (section 18 (1) of the
National Pensions Reserve Fund, 2000).
To this end, the Commission has been granted
... a strictly commercial investment mandate for the Fund
with the objective of securing the optimal return over the
long tema subject to prudent risk management (Department
of Finance, 2000b).
In this section, we analyse some issues concerning the optimal investment
strategy for the Fund.
4.1 The Four Stages of the Fund’s Life Cycle
We can think of the Fund as evolving through four stages. The first stage
is the initiation phase during which the Fund invests the current cash pile.
There are potentially some timing issues as to how quickly the Fund
attains its "optimal pot*folio" but this implementation problem is beyond
the .scope of this paper. The second stage is the pure accumulation phase
running until 2025. During this interval, there will be no withdrawals from
the t\md. Tim third stage is the 2025-2055 period during which there will
still be new inflows into the fund but also annual withdrawals. The fourth
and final stage is the post-2055 period in which no further contributions
:ire made and the Fund will be run clown over time.9
In thinking about the appropriate investment strategy of the Fund, I
will focus on the second and third stages of the Fund’s life cycle.
4.2 The Second Stage
Finance theory broadly distinguishes between three asset classes: cash,
bonds and equity.
Bonds and equity can be jointly considered the set of "risky" assetsJ°
One decision facing an investor is the share of the portfolio that should
’~ The legislation allows for the end-date to be extended beyond 2055 but we take it as fixed
lbr convenience.
~° The absence of inflation indexation and time variation in the real interest rate means that
cash is not strictly risk-free but we adopt the conventional terminology here. The riskiness of
cash is dealt with late," in this section.
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be allocated to risky assets. The existence of an "equity premium" -
higher average returns on equity than on bonds - also means that the
investor must also decide the composition of the risky part of the
portfolio between equity and bonds.
Recent developments in portfolio theow suggest that an investor can
afford to be more aggressive, the longer is the investment horizon
(Barberis, 2000; Campbell and Viceira, 2000; Viceira, 2001). One reason is
that equity returns are less volatile, the longer is the investment horizon.
Another is that financial assets form a smaller part of total wealth
(including human capital) the further away is an investor fi’om retirement,
so that such an investor can afford to be more aggressive in accepting risk
in return for high potential returns. As the financial portfolio grows in
importance in total wealth, the optimal investment strategy becomes less
aggressive over time.
With respect to the public equity allocation, a natural benchmark is for
the Fund to "hold the world". What would justify deviations from this
neutral strategy?
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, one may wish to take into account
the co-variation of equity returns with some large and identifiable
macroeconomic risks to the Irish economy. For instance, it is plausible
that the Irish output growth positively depends on economic
developments in our major trading partners.’1 As such, to hedge against
the risk of slow growth at home, it may be wise to undelweight our
trading partners in the design of the Fund’s portfolio)~
By similar logic, the portfolio weights that are allocated to those
industrial sectors in which Ireland specialises may need some adjustment.
It is actually ambiguous whether these sectors should be over-weighted
or unde>weighted in the Fund’s portfolio)3 Put differently, is what is
good for Intel also good for Ireland?’ For instance, if Intel discovered a
more attractive location and shifted production out of Ireland, the
fortunes of Intel and Ireland would move in opposite directions. In this
case, a natural hedge is for the Fund to own Intel stock. On the other
hand, a negative technological or competitive shock that hurt Intel and
" For instance, there is evidence that international diffusion of productivity innovations
follows trade patterns (Coe and Helpman, 1995). FDI and migration patterns provide other
mechanisms that link productivity growth across nations.
~a Honohan and Lane (2000b), however, show that our trading partners are actually heavily
represented in Irish investment portfolios. In particular, the UK is strikingly over-
represented. That paper discusses the potential explanations for this apparent sub-
optimality. See also Lane (2000b) on Irish international financial diversification.
,3 See also Davis and Willen (2000).
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also caused it to contract production in Ireland would see the fortunes of
Intel and h’eland moving in the same, direction. Here, the appropriate
hedge is to undelweight or even go short in Intel’s equiW. Assessing the
balance of risk requires detailed sectoral - and firm-level analysis: this
may be an interesting avenue for future research in modelling the optimal
portfolio for the Fund.
Beyond these systematic macroeconomic and sectoral risks, there may
also be some scope for active management to exploit some potential
"gaps" in the market. Here, it is important to take into account the impact
of active management strategies on overall portfolio risk by understanding
the correlations of the returns on actively-managed stocks with other
components of the portfolio.’’~ To some extent, this risk analysis can be
conducted using historical correlation patterns. However, historical
correlation matrices are of limited value during periods of market
illiquidity and with respect to shares in entirely-new sectors (such as
internet stocks).’5 Moreover, it is difficult to work out potential covariation
patterns between publicly-traded assets and more illiquid assets such as
private equiW, venture capital and property investments.
Finally, a long horizon also means that cash is a risky investment,
since it must be reinvested at uncertain real interest rates. Accordingly,
the conservative part of the portfolio should largely take the form of long-
tenn bonds rather than cash, since this hedges against the risk of a
decline in real interest rates (Campbell and Viceira, 2001).
4.3 The Third Stage
During the third stage, the Fund will be making contributions to the fiscal
budget to ease the costs of th~ increased pension burden that is expected
after 2025. As such, the investment horizon will naturally be shorter and
the mix of the fund will shift away from equities and towards bonds and
cash. However, the fact that the peak of the Irish pensions burden is not
expected until around 2050 means that the investment horizon should
actually remain quite long, with only a gradual shift out of equities in the
initial years after 2025.
However, the short-tern1 covariances between Irish fiscal variables and
asset returns may take on greater importance in portfolio selection during
this third stage. Ideally, the payout from the Fund to the Exchequer
should stabilise the fiscal positions, with a larger payout being made
** Returns should of course be measured net of the higher fees charged by active manage,s.
*s See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Lowenstein (2000).
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during recessions than in expansions. This can be best achieved if the
Fund’s return negatively covaries with domestic tax revenues and
positively covaries with domestic public spending needs,la
4.4 Some Empirical Analysis
In this subsection, we conduct some empirical analysis that illustrates the
potential importance of taking into account the covariation between
ctomestic macroeconomic performance and international asset returns.
In Table 3, we regress Irish output growth on international equity
returns and bond yields.17 Column (1) just includes the return on the MSCI
world equity index (EQW) and a GDP-weighted average world bond
yield (BW))8 This simple specification does quite well in terms of
"explaining" 30 per cent of the movement in Irish output. Importantly,
Irish growth negatively covaries with the world equity return and world
bond yield: holding positive positions in these financial assets provides a
hedge against Irish output risk.
In columns (2)-(5), we add additional country-level asset returns.19 The
addition of the UK and US in columns (2) and (3) do improve the fit of
the regression and the most striking finding is that, holding fixed world
asset returns, there is positive co-variation between UK and US financial
returns and Irish growth. The implication is that hedging would require us
to underweight UK and US assets relative to their importance in world
financial indices.
In columns (4) and (5), we see that there is essentially no relation
between German asset returns and Irish growth performance but that the
addition of Japan improves explanatory power to some extent. Here, the
point estimate indicates that Irish growth negatively covaries with the
Japanese bond yield, suggesting that Japan should perhaps be ove>
weighted in the bond component of the Fund.
The results in Table 3 are clearly only a crude first step in thinking
about the relation between international financial returns and Irish
macroeconomic performance. It would be interesting to extend this
analysis to look at the relation between asset returns and Irish fiscal
’" See Lloyd-Ellis and Zhu (2000).
~7 These asset returns are adjusted for currency depreciation and inflation to obtain the real
returns that matter to Irish investors. See also Davis et al. (2001).
’~ The bond yield is on 10-year government bonds and the world index includes the United
States, Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom. Ideally, one would like to use the total
bond remm but these data were not to hand.
~" Limited degrees of freedom means that we add countries one-at-a-time.
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variables (aggregate and subcomponents of public expenditure, tax
revenue and the fiscal deficit) and consider a broader array of asset
returns. The historical returns are clearly also only a limited guide to the
future: in particular, Ireland’s membership of EMU means that the co-
wniation of hish domestic variables and currency fluctuations is likely to
be quite different.
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Honohan and Lane (2000b) provide an alternative empirical approach.
In that paper, the authors calculated the matrix of return correlations over
1970-97 between Irish national income (NNI) and historical stock market
returns in the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and Japan.2°
On the assumption that the return correlations remain stable, the authors
were then able to compute the geographical composition of the mean-
variance efficient portfolio)’ Figure 5 reveals that the efficient portfolio
would not be heavily weighted in UK and German assets: on the
contraw, it would involve negative holdings (short sales) of UK stocks
and near-zero holdings of German stocks in order to finance higher
holdings of Japanese and US assets. Again, the mean-variance calculations
clearly are not an adequate basis for portfolio decisions but the exercise
20 See also Bodie and Merton (2000).
2, The calculation also requires some assumption about mean and variance of future returns.
We experimented with various assumptions here, including (i) the use of historic values, (ii)
imposition of common mean and variance across countries, (iii) increasing the assumed
mean return for Ireland to reflect home preference. While different assumptions do change
the efficient portfolio, the qualitative conclusions were unaffected.
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reinforces the point that the covariance between domestic
macroeconomic and fiscal variables and financial returns should be
incorporated into the design of the Fund’s portfolio.
In the foregoing, we have examined countw-level returns. For the
reasons noted above, it would be useful to also examine the co-
movement between domestic macroeconomic and fiscal variables with
sectoral returns - for instance, what is the covariance between Irish tax
revenue and the global high-technology sector?
5. The Management of the Fund
In this section, we discuss some corporate governance and operational
issues in the management of the Fund. Box 5.1 at the end of the section
contains a case study of the Norwegian Government Petroleum Fund
which also provides some useful lessons for the design of the new Fund.
Under the legislation, a Commission will be appointed to oversee the
Fund. It will be responsible for setting the investment strategy for the
Fund. The NTMA will be the manager of the Fund and its chief executive
is ex-officio also a member of the Commission. The Commission will
pec/brm all its functions through the Manager and it is also free to
delegate any of its functions to the Manager. The NTMA has been initially
appointed for a ten-year period: after that, the management contract will
be five years in duration and the Commission will be free to appoint
another agent as manager of the Fund. The legislation requires the
Commission to make an annual report to the Minister of Finance. The
Oireachtas Committee on Public Accounts will also be free to interview
the Chairnaan of the Commission and the Chief Executive of the Manager.
This structure has the considerable advantage of avoiding the need to
establish an all-new agency to manage the Fund. However, its formal
organisation has some debatable features. First, the Commission does not
have fl’eedom in the first ten years in its choice of manager. It has no
direct power to fire the chief executive of the Fund, since the head of the
NTlVlA is appointed by the Minister of Finance. Moreover, the head of the
NTMA is also a member of the Commission: as the only "executive"
member, he will have an extraordinarily influential position within the
Commission. The special status of the NTMA head is reinforced by the
fact that the Manager has been appointed for ten years whereas the
longest contract for the other Commissioners is only five years.22
*" The Chairman is appointed for five years. The ordinary members of the Commission will
be appointed for three or four years.
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The option to delegate any (all) functions to the manager further
enhances the potential power of the manager. For instance, the legislation
could permit the NTMA to set its own benchmark, if the Commission
delegated this function to it. Standard corporate governance principles
suggest that this structure may be unstable. Indeed, it is hard to see how
the NTMA could be replaced even at the end of its initial contract since
the advantages of incumbency are potentially veW high under the
legislation. Still, the option to change managers will presumably curb to
some extent incentives to "empire build" on the part of the NTMA.
In managing the Fund, it is anticipated that the NTMA will employ an
array of external managers, especially in investing the equity component
of the Fund. Keeping a lid on management fees will be an important
factor in determining the Fund’s overall net return so that it is to be
hoped that intense competition among external managers will shave fees
to a minimum. The instruction and monitoring of the external managers
will be a major responsibility for the NTMA.
The optimal reporting frequency on the performance of the Fund is an
interesting problem. The legislation mandates an annual report but the
Commission could voluntarily release information at a higher frequency
(say, quarterly) if it wished. On the one side, more frequent reporting
would promote transparency and openness. On the other, at least in its
early stages, the projected investment horizon for the Fund is twenty-
five/fifty-five years such that high-frequency reporting may distort the
behaviour of the Fund by placing the manager under pressure to produce
high short-term returns, even at the expense of worse long-term
performance.
In general, the long-term investment horizon makes proper evaluation
of the Fund’s performance a veW difficult technical question. Evaluation
really has three parts: (a) is the benchmark portfolio optimally designed?;
(b) are deviations from the benchmark justifiable?; (c) has the operation
of the fund been efficient and cost effective? Part (a) is at least initially the
responsibility of the Commission; part (b) is the responsibility of the
manager, if it is given the fl’eedom to depart from the benchmark; and
part (c) refers to the operation of both the Commission and the manager.
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Box5.1: A Case Study: Norway’s Government Petroleum Fund
Norway established the Government Petroleum Fund (GPF)in 1990 to
invest part of its significant oil revenues.~ The objective is to accumulate
assets that will generate investment income for the g0vernmentin future
years, when oil revenues, decline and the burden ofrising pension
expenditures becomes more severe.2~
The Norwegian Ministry of Finance. directs the GPF’s .investment
strategy, with the Norwegian Central Bank charged-with its management.
The resources of the Ministry of Finance means thai it is not reliant on-the
manager for advice on strategy, providing a high:degree of inctependei~ce
bet ~veen the trustees and the -.managei’-, The Ministry of F’inance sets
the benchmark portfolio: fixing the allocation between equity and fixed-
income insiruments and the geographical spread Witl~in each asset’dass
The manager has some limited freedom to d6part from’tl{is befichma~k
but file actual portfolio may fiever, deviate from the benchmark portfolio
to the extent that annualised expected tracking eri~or’,eXceeds i:5:
¯ ¯ 25percentage points.. . ,
None of the capital of the GPF is-inv’ested in NOrway, Assuch, the
politieisation problem in setting and execrating investment strategg is
ehnm~ated. To furtliei" av0td control, problems the GPF can hold onlyTa
maximmn of3 per cent ofthe share capltal (or of the voting shares):-in
any one firm. ..... . .............
6. Conclusions
This paper has reviewed some key issues in understanding the role to be
played by the new National Pensions Reserve Fund. In particular, we
have emphasised the importance of avoiding the politicisation of
investment policy. To this end, it is regrettable that the Act failed to
prohibit ii~vestment iil domestic assets.
a~ See tlle elaborate and detailed web site for the Norwegian Petroleum Fund at
http://www.norges-ba nk.no/english/petroleum_fund
" The GPF is not formally a pension fund but the rising pensions burden is cited as a motive
fo," its establishment.
~ Expected tracking error is defined as the expected value of the standard deviation of the
difference between the annual return on actual investments and the return on the
benchmark portfolio. This means that, over time, the difference between the returns on the
actual portfolio and the benchmark portfolio will be less than 1.5 percentage points in two
out Of th,’ee years. The tracking error is calculated using the BARRA risk-management
model.
:¢’ However, there is a vigorous political debate in Norway about the trade-off between
current consumption and.acctmmlating assets for the future.
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The long horizon of the Fund suggests that it initially should be largely
invested in equities. Within the equity allocation, it is desirable to take
into account the pattern of national and sectoral covariation with Irish
macroeconomic and fiscal variables, since the goal of the Fund is to
supplement the Irish public finances. Much more research on this
question is required. Comprehensive risk assessment of the actively-
managed components of the Fund is also highly important but this is a
vew difficult task, since evaluation cannot solely rely on historical return
correlation matrices.
Finally, we have also raised some questions about the organisational
structure of the Fund. In particular, the relation between the Commission
and the Manager is quite fluid in the legislation. It will be interesting to
observe how the operation of the Fund evolves over time.
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